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Abstract 
Since the end of the Uruguay Round, Brazil has become a protagonist in the multilateral trade 
system and in its dispute resolution mechanism. This work analyzes the Brazilian experience, and 
explains how a greater participation in trade disputes was provoked by institutional and political 
changes that took effect in the country during the last two decades. These changes include an 
active participation from the private sector and the political relevance that trade disputes have 
acquired. 
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I. Introduction 
Any scholar visiting Brazil these days may be interested in the local newspapers and magazines. 
The visitor will certainly be stunned by the low number of pages dedicated by the local media to 
international issues. Even when compared to the press in neighboring countries, the Brazilian 
press is mostly dedicated to national problems and local news. This tendency probably reflects 
the main interests of their readers, inhabitants of a gigantic territory who will hardly have the 
opportunity to visit foreign lands along their lives, or to foresee how distant events may affect 
their interests in some way. 
Nevertheless, one exception to this inward-looking tendency of Brazilians may be 
discovered, where international issues are concerned. International trade usually raises interest 
and international trade topics prevail in the few pages that daily newspapers dedicate to 
international issues. 
This is a remarkable change if one considers the timid Brazilian participation in the 
Uruguay Round. Actually, Brazil and India are probably the best examples of renewed interest in 
international trade, after many years of being subjugated by other defense and regional concerns. 
Leaders among developing countries and active players in the current multilateral trade 
negotiations, Brazil and India represent the rising protagonism of previously modest players. 
Brazilian activism in the world trading system may be also identified in the dispute 
settlement arena. Since 1995, Brazil has been an assiduous claimant at the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and at the South American Common Market (MERCOSUR) dispute 
mechanism. The latter case is not surprising: Brazil represents 79,35% of MERCOSUR´s GNP, 
and the number of cases is less than proportional to this economic prevalence. However, 
explaining Brazilian pre-eminent participation at the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) 
requires a more sophisticated explanation.  
This paper asserts that the recent evolution of Brazil´s participation in international 
disputes derives mainly from domestic pressures. Hence, one must understand the institutional 
and political changes that took effect in the country during the last two decades. These changes 
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not only make trade a central topic for the local industry, but also make trade (and trade disputes) 
a relevant electoral topic.1 
In order to reach this conclusion, the next section describes the radical evolution of trade 
policy in Brazil after the 1990s, when international trade was opened. The following sections will 
describe Brazilian experiences with both regional and multilateral dispute resolution. Next, the 
questions proposed by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) 
will be considered, based on available data regarding the Brazilian experience. The final section 




                                                     
1
 An example of the electoral relevance of trade disputes may be identified in the last electoral campaign. 
The two main candidates argued tirelessly about which parties (Workers´ Party or Social Democratic 
Party, respectively) won more claims at the WTO. See “Política externa gera embate acalorado entre 
Lula e Alckmin”. Oct 9th,. 2006. BBCBrasil.com, http://www.bbc.co.uk/portuguese/reporterbbc/story/ 
2006/10/061009_ debatepoliticaexternacg.shtml. 
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II. Trade Policy in Brazil (1990-2007) 
Before the 1990s, a central word related to Brazilian trade policy was import-substitution. Just as 
in other Latin American countries, Brazilian policy-makers were heavily influenced by the 20th 
century view that foreign goods represented a threat to the national infant industry, and that trade 
policy was dependant on industrial policies for regional development. High tariffs, generous 
subsidies, and a high level of state intervention were natural consequences. 
Another consequence was that Brazil´s participation in multilateral arrangements 
liberalizing trade was not, after World War II, a priority for its foreign policy. Although the 
country was an original contracting party to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), and an important advocate for the creation of the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD), trade was still a secondary topic in the Brazilian foreign agenda.2 
Trade policy in Brazil radically changed in the 1990s, after Fernando Collor de Mello 
took the Brazilian presidency. In many ways, Collor de Mello represented the national icon of 
liberal reformists elected in other Latin American countries during that period. His aggressive 
discourse for modernization and market efficiency led to sudden openness in international trade, 
radically reducing tariffs even before the end of the Uruguay Round. Thus, tariffs were graciously 
cut at the beginning of his term. The average tariff rate, which had already been reduced from 
more than 50% in 1987 to 32.2% in 1990, was scheduled to be further reduced unilaterally to 
14.2% by the beginning of 1994. Non-tariff trade barriers and special import prohibitions were 
abolished. “The removal of bilateral sources of friction with the United States became a priority 
in a situation marked by a comprehensive effort to regain credibility which included also efforts 
on deregulation, privatization and price stabilization.”3 
                                                     
2
 “Brazil was a GATT founding father but its involvement up to the Tokyo Round was really marginal. 
Brazilian stance in the UNCTAD in the 1960’s underlined the importance of statements of principle in 
Brazilian foreign economic policy and also the considerable autonomy of Itamaraty in the definition of 
such a policy. The reversal of the timid trade liberalization of 1967 in the late 1960’s and the 
concentration of interest in GSP preferences made it natural that Brazil continued aligned to the G-77 
grand coalition of developing countries which had taken shape in New Delhi in the first UNCTAD 
conference in 1964”. Cf. Abreu, 1998, p. 23. 
3
 Abreu, 1998, p. 26. 
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Opening international trade, which was initiated in the early 1990s, saw some steps back, 
mainly in industrial and automobile sectors, once the low competitiveness of local industries 
became apparent. Nevertheless, most tariffs were kept at a lower level than in previous years, and 
data related to trade witnessed increasing flows. 
The participation of international trade in the Brazilian GNP increased during the next 
presidential term, after 1994. In fact, economic policy during these years was marked by the 
attempt to control inflation, and openness to competitive imports was a key element in this policy. 
Moreover, to stabilize prices, the “Real Plan,” was anchored in the U.S. dollar. Although the 
program was successful in controlling inertial inflation, it also kept an over-valuated exchange for 
the domestic currency, promoting more imports and reducing the competitiveness of local firms. 
In this context, the reaction from local industries was predictable. Domestic industries 
openly lobbied for protection against foreign goods, while more organized sectors lobbied for 
temporary relief. Trade remedies, especially anti-dumping measures, were increasingly imposed, 
whereas subsidies for the automobile industry attracted new investments for the country. In fact, 
the first claims against Brazil before the WTO were brought by the Philippines (against 
countervailing measures imposed by Brazilian authorities on the imports of coconuts),4 and by a 
group of countries against the Brazilian policy of attracting investments in the automobile sector.5 
Related to the relevance of multilateral trade arrangements, Brazil became deeply 
involved with attempts to regionally integrate within MERCOSUR. In fact, initiatives for regional 
integration in South America may be identified since the 1960s, MERCOSUR was the success 
story, at least in its initial years. From 1991, when the Treaty of Asuncion was signed, to 1998, 
when the Brazilian currency crisis began, regional trade quadrupled.6 After 1998, the relevance of 
regional trade for MERCOSUR partners was diminished due to complex factors: the devaluation 
of the Brazilian Real, which contaminated the neighbor economies; the resulting and 
unprecedented economic crisis in Argentina; long-lasting resentment from minor partners 
(Paraguay and Uruguay); the reduction of MERCOSUR´s political relevance after democracy 
was consolidated and military moves in the regional were no more a threat; personal 
characteristics of national leaders, who gave less importance to regional trade (at least in practice) 
than previous presidents. 
The number and features of disputes within MERCOSUR are closely related to these 
complex factors. Generally speaking, most cases derive from protectionist measures or barriers to 
market access. As discussed in the following section, the majority of disputes were solved by 
direct negotiation between the parties involved, and this flexibility is regularly praised as one of 
MERCOSUR´s positive characteristics. The weak dispute resolution mechanism, likewise, has 
allowed for many negotiated outcomes, and, in spite of systemic incertitude, most (if not all) 
judgments were fully complied with by MERCOSUR partners. 
                                                     
4
 Brazil-Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconuts (WT/DS22). The Philippines requested consultations 
with Brazil (November 27th 1995) regarding a countervailing duty imposed by Brazil on the 
Philippine’s exports of desiccated coconut. The Philippines claimed that this duty was inconsistent with 
WTO and GATT rules. Panel established on March 5th 1996, with Canada, the EC, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Sri Lanka and the U.S. as third-parties. The Panel Report (October 17th 1996) concluded that 
the provisions of the agreements relied on by the claimant were inapplicable to the dispute. Philippines 
appealed. The AB Report (February 21st 1997) upheld the Panel’s decision.. 
5
 Brazil – Certain Automotive Investment Measures: WT/DS51 (Japan as complainant); WT/DS52 and 
WT/DS65 (US as complainant); WT/DS81 (EU as complainant). Although an official settlement was 
never reached, claimants did not request a panel, since Brazilian regulations on the matter expired in 
1999. 
6
 On the evolution of trade within MERCOSUR, and its economic cycles, see Machinea (2003). 
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This brief history of Brazilian trade policy during the last two decades indicates that trade 
has been acquiring importance in the national economy. In spite of oscillating government 
orientation, and after decades of import substitution, a more liberal trade regime, widely accepted 
by economic agents, seems to have fused in the country.  Occasional upheavals from affected 
industries have been transformed to sector pressures, rather than on generic challenges to the 
openness of trade flows. 
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III. A Primer on Trade Disputes in Brazil 
If the economic mood can be described as a positive view towards more liberal trade, the 
Brazilian behavior towards trade disputes was highly affected by institutional evolution in recent 
years. Such evolution was clearly marked by the increasing relevance of these disputes in a 
domestic political scenario where democracy was being affirmed. After three decades of 
authoritarian rule, greater transparency in public administration after 1988 allowed more 
information to flow to business associations, civil society, and academic researchers. 
Concurrently, democracy allowed organized groups to lobby for trade measures, either as 
protectionist devices against imports or as claims against barriers to Brazilian exports. 
In terms of trade policy, business associations became increasingly aware of the 
relevance of trade liberalization for their plans. During the 1990s, these associations created 
institutional links with decisional instances of the governmental bureaucratic structure. 
Associations such as the Brazilian Confederation of Industries or the powerful Sao Paulo 
Industrial Federation created specific departments to follow the negotiations, and aligned within 
the Brazilian Business Coalition, an organization that presented the views from the business 
community to the official negotiators.7 
A concrete example of this proactive behavior towards trade issues in recent years comes 
from the Brazilian agricultural industry. Until the 1990s, the highly subsidized Brazilian 
agriculture lobbied mainly for generous loans from official banks. An unprecedented crisis 
followed in the 1990s, when foreign competition was combined with inefficient techniques and 
poor infrastructure. After this painful period (and its terrible social consequences), the Brazilian 
agriculture reemerged as a highly-skilled and productive sector, with a high level of investment. 
Next, Brazil’s concerns shifted to custom barriers and distorting subsidies in developed countries. 
The agricultural sector achieved an impressive level of organization, lobbying continuously for 
new cases to be taken to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), while their representatives 
are frequently present at the Brazilian Business Coalition. 
                                                     
7
 See Shaffer et al., 2006, p. 38 [noting that “´[t]he Summit of the Americas with its parallel meeting of 
the Business Forum in Belo Horizonte, Brazil, in 1997, was the turning point, triggering the creation of 
an official partnership between Brazil’s industrial and agricultural sectors under the Brazilian Business 
Coalition (Coalizão Empresarial Brasileira, or CEB). CEB brought together 166 Brazilian business 
associations and enterprises under a single umbrella”]. 
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The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Itamaraty) itself is an example of how the evolution in 
trade relations promoted institutional openness. Traditionally the most hermetic bureaucratic 
organization in the Brazilian government, Itamaraty was progressively opened to inputs from 
civil society and business community in the 1990s, mainly through specialized meetings. At the 
same time, specialized bodies were created, detached from the traditional vision of the generalist 
diplomatic career. An illustration related to dispute settlement was the creation of the General 
Coordination of Disputes (CGC) within the Ministry´s structure.8 The CGC´s performance in 
WTO disputes became apparent, earning it a higher reputation among the trade community in 
Brazil.9 
An interesting experience demonstrating the Brazilian attitude in this area was an event, 
in December 2006, involving two representatives from each South American country that dealt 
with dispute settlement in the WTO. The one-week meeting was sponsored by Itamaraty and 
organized by CGC in Sao Paulo. The meeting was based on case studies involving the countries 
present, and on presentations regarding the evolution of procedural practices before panels and 
the Appellate Body.10 
CGC’s good reputation attracted interest from other ministries in the Brazilian 
government in regards to international trade disputes. The General Attorney Office expressed its 
interest in following the cases, for instance.11 Furthermore, the economic impact of trade disputes 
provoked attentiveness from the Ministry of Development and Trade, the Ministry of the 
Environment, the Ministry of Finance, and other specialized agencies. The different, and 
sometimes conflicting, points of views are occasionally identifiable during the meeting of the 
Chamber of Foreign Trade (Camex), the inter-ministerial body responsible for proposing policies 
related to trade.12 
Not surprisingly, the interest in trade has not been limited solely to the government 
spheres. An increasing number of cases is routinely reported, and these news are appealing to 
public opinion. In fact, a general knowledge about trade disputes involving Brazil was 
particularly visible after the Brazil-Aircraft case or, rather, after the Canadian reaction.13  
In 1996, Canada and Brazil began a time-consuming dispute at the WTO, with reciprocal 
accusations of directing prohibited subsidies to their national aircraft industry.14 The case 
triggered Brazilian pride in their most technologically advanced industry, and the case caught 
popular attention. Later, when Canada was authorized to retaliate due to Brazil’s inaction on 
                                                     
8
 CGC was created by Decree N. 3.959/2001. Currently, Itamaraty´s staff organization is regulated by 
Decree 5.979/2006. 
9
 CGC first coordinator was Counselor Roberto Azevedo, a seasoned diplomat in Geneva and a former 
panelist at the WTO. His successor, Counselor Flavio Marega, a bright diplomat with longtime 
experience in Washington, leads the group of five specialists in trade disputes in Brasilia, and others at 
the Brazilian embassy in Geneva. See “O Brasil aprendeu a brigar na OMC”. Folha de São Paulo. Feb 
21st 2002. http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/brasil/fc2102200222.htm. 
10
 “Ciclo de palestras para funcionários governamentais sobre o sistema de solução de controvérsias da 
OMC”. http://www.mre.gov.br/portugues/imprensa/nota_detalhe.asp?ID_RELEASE=4120. 
11
 The Attorney General recently revealed that he wants, as one of his aims, “to enlarge the Brazilian 
international defense, in a partnership with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs”. Cf. Advocacia-Geral da 
União (2007). 
12
 Camex is regulated by Decree 4.732/2003. 
13
 See WT/DS46. Shaffer notes that “Brazil became one of the most active users of the WTO disputes 
settlement system following the Embraer case, adopting an approach based on public and private 
networks for capacity building and strategic litigation”. Shaffer et al., 2006, p. 18. 
14
 WT/DS46, WT/DS70, WT/DS71, WT/DS222. These cases are mentioned more extensively below, in 
Section 3.3. 
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reforming the challenged domestic rules, Canada instead banned imports of Brazilian beef, 
alleging an inexistent bovine spongiform encephalopathy (mad cow) outbreak in Brazil.15 
Popular reaction was immediate: from a consumer boycott on Canadian imports to a 
barbecue before the Canadian embassy, the case boosted national belligerence in a way 
uncommon to a country unused to international conflicts. Moreover, the dispute contributed to 
educate the public about ongoing events at the WTO and MERCOSUR. 
Another case with perceptible impact over the Brazilian public opinion was the dispute 
between Brazil and the United States regarding compulsory licenses for pharmaceuticals. A 
longtime nightmare for trade negotiators on both sides, the provision in the Brazilian patent law 
allowing compulsory license in case of public health was considered a central aspect for the 
policy of donating medicines for HIV patients.16 Pressured by its laboratories, the U.S. 
government presented a complaint to the WTO, alleging the breach of TRIPS provisions in May 
1999. 17 
The repercussions in Brazil were immediate. The government led a well orchestrated 
campaign with different NGOs, while the national and international press censured the U.S. 
move.18 When the ministerial conference began in Doha, the issue of compulsory license was a 
point of honor for the Brazilian public and the minister of health, who was by then a candidate for 
presidency.19 The Declaration on the Trips Agreement and Public Health was seen as another 
victory for Brazil in the world trading system, although a panel was never, in fact, established. 
Trade disputes became a fashionable topic not only among the public. In the Brazilian 
academy, trade regulation became the central subject in International Law, with dozens of 
publications blossoming around the country.20 Simultaneously, graduate programs dedicated to 
international trade were created in schools of law, management, and economics. Another novelty 
is the organization of think tanks providing specific studies for industries that awoke to the 
relevance of trade negotiations for their business strategies.21 
Law firms’ contribution to Brazil’s national interest in trade deserves a paragraph. In 
some cases, foreign law firms represented Brazilian companies interested in the outcome of an 
international trade dispute. For Brazilian law firms, this represented lost opportunities in a 
promising market. Thus, while the main law firms being created, with Itamaraty, a successful 
internship program that drove dozens of young lawyers to Geneva and Washington, for a three-
                                                     
15
 Rich (2001), for example, wrote that “The Brazilian government threatened to abandon talks over a 
hemispheric free-trade zone and to impose trade sanctions on Canadian products if the ban was not 
lifted [while] port workers union has called on stevedores in Brazil's main ports not to unload Canadian 
cargo”. 
16
 Cf. Federal Law n. 9,279 of May 14th 1996, article 68. 
17
 WT/DS199. Mutually agreed solution notified to the WTO in July 19th, 2001 
18
 See “The Urgency of Cheaper Drugs”. New York Times. Oct 31st 2001. 
<http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F30715F93E540C728FDDA90994D9404482>; “US 




 Mr. José Serra heralded the Doha Declaration on Public Health as one of his achievements, during the 
presidential campaign. See “Eleição faz escala no Qatar, com guerra de patentes”. Folha de São Paulo. 
Nov. 4th, 2001. <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/dinheiro/fi0411200111.htm>. 
20
 A quick research in a known online bookstore indicates that 30 books on the WTO and a dozen books 
on international dispute resolution were published in Brazil in the last ten years. Cf. 
http://www.livcultura.com.br. 
21
 A well-known example of think tank is ICONE, an institute based in Sao Paulo and funded by the 
Brazilian agricultural associations. Cf. http://www.iconebrasil.org.br. 
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month internship at each firm’s expense. Besides training lawyers on the intricacies of trade 
regulation, the internship program provoked a collateral effect: once they are back to Brazil, these 
young lawyers are under pressure from the firm partners to develop clients and cases related to 
trade. Nevertheless, after recognizing that a case at the WTO is not a daily event, these 
practitioners specialize in trade remedies and non-tariff barriers, bringing a new dynamic to trade 
disputes before Brazilian courts.22 
Since 2004, the training program for lawyers was extended to the trade department at the 
Brazilian Embassy in Washington, with the same features. The Brazilian Embassy also sponsors 
the Brazilian International Trade Scholars (ABCI), an Institute that regularly gathers academics 
and practitioners in the U.S. capital. ABCI has become an important source for networking, 
academic research, and an exchange of ideas on trade disputes involving Brazilian interests.23 
Considering this evolution, Brazil’s activism in international trade disputes is not 
completely unexpected. Actually, the country participated in 9.92% of all 363 cases before the 
WTO Dispute Settlement Body, a remarkable number for a developing country that currently 
represents 1% of world trade. In most cases (22 or 6.06% of total cases) Brazil was the claimant, 
whereas 14 (or 3.87% of the total) claims were presented against Brazilian measures. Roughly, 
Brazil has brought twice as many claims than it has defended claims at the WTO. 
Evidently, these statistics must be adjusted to the realities of disputes before the WTO, 
where the participation of developing countries is relatively small. Faced with administrative and 
financial constraints, the majority of developing countries have never presented a claim either at 
the WTO or before other international fora.24 Indeed, Shaffer et al. (2006) noted that developing 
countries confront three important challenges: (i) the capacity to organize information concerning 
trade barriers and opportunities to challenge them, and a relative lack of legal expertise in WTO 
law; (ii) constrained financial resources, including for the hiring of outside legal counsel; and (iii) 
fear of political and economic pressure from the United States and EC, undermining their ability 
to bring WTO claims.25 
In this context, Brazil has a privileged position vis-à-vis other developing countries. Even 
when its governmental structure faced cyclical scarcity of human and financial resources, the 
private sector has been a recurrent partner, by financing lawyers and other costs related to the 
dispute. Actually, the hiring of specialized lawyers to support the Brazilian position by interested 
companies has been relatively common, although the final strategy is dictated by CGC.26 The 
                                                     
22
 One example of the increasing number of trade remedies: between 1988 and 1994, Brazil imposed 21 
final measures related to trade remedies, whereas between 1995 and 2005 the country imposed 101 final 
measures. Cf. Departamento de Defesa Comercial (2006). 
23
 Publications sponsored by ABCI include Lima-Campos (2005) and Lima-Campos (2006). ABCI has 
also organized annual trade symposiums in Washington. See http://www.wilsoncenter.org. 
24
 On the constraints faced by developing countries when involved in disputes before the DSU, see 
Gusman and Simmons (2005)[concluding that poor states behave differently than their rich counterparts 
because they lack the financial, human, and institutional capital to participate fully in the dispute 
resolution system”]; Nordstrom (2003)[stating that “the activity level is highly uneven and closely 
correlated with size and income levels”], and Abbott (2007) [concluding that “it is rather problems of 
internal governance and organization in many capitals that may be responsible for the relative absence 
of many members from the WTO dispute scene”]. One interesting analysis of the participation of Latin 
American countries is in Biggs (2005). 
25
 Shaffer et al., 2006, p. 26. 
26
 In Canadá-Aircraft, the Brazilian manufacturer (Embraer) assumed costs of foreign lawyers involved in 
the case. In United States-Cotton and EC-Sugar, the Association of Brazilian Cotton Industry and the 
Association of Brazilian Sugar Industry hired the same U.S. firm to prepare the case.  Goldhaber, 2006. 
On this sense, the CGC Coordinator recently asserted that “the partnership with the private sector has 
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Brazilian government itself has promoted an international bid to hire a law firm in complaints 
against its domestic measures, a path probably unavailable to many developing countries. 
Moreover, Brazilian presence in various trade disputes may be also understood by the 
country’s diversified export interests. From aircraft to cotton, from gasoline to sugar, different 
pressure groups are incited in Brazil whenever a protectionist measure is adopted in importing 
markets. Evidently, these groups have different levels of organization and political relevance, and 
their capacity to convince the Brazilian government to bring a claim before the WTO may vary 
enormously. 
Another explanation for the Brazilian private sector´s eagerness to bring cases to the 
WTO could be a high rate of compliance. Data on this topic is far from conclusive, however. In 
most cases won by Brazil, as commented below, an immediate implementation with material 
advantages for the exporting industry could not be identified. Even in landmark cases (such as 
US-Cotton), in which the participation of the private sector was fundamental, implementation was 
diffuse and time-consuming, without clear evidence that the Brazilian private sector raised profits 
out of such implementation. 
In spite of the uncertain results and high costs, Brazilian business associations still seem 
convinced that international trade disputes are a valuable tool for their export strategies. As 
mentioned in this section, such a belief is probably motivated by domestic political factors, 
including the incentive for business leaders to show that all resources are being used to defend 
their constituencies, rather than by effective results from litigating in international courts. 
If this assumption is correct, Brazil will continue to be a frequent claimant in trade 
disputes. Firstly, because an indefinite number of complaints from the domestic industry are 
being contained pending the outcome of the current multilateral negotiation process. If these 
complaints are not resolved within the negotiations, they will certainly turn into new claims 
before the WTO. Secondly, because the continuing coordination among trade associations, 
inflamed by lawyers and consultants, will bring claims to the WTO as a legitimate means to 
enlarge access to foreign markets. Thirdly, because the greater number of claims in defense of the 
domestic industry is a political discourse that new presidents will not want to lose. 
After this general presentation about the evolution and prospects for trade disputes in 
Brazil, the following sections are dedicated to the cases in which the country was involved since 
the GATT years. 
A. Disputes in the GATT 
According to Abreu (1998), Brazil’s most interesting initiative in the GATT in the 1960s was a 
joint effort with Uruguay, regarding the nullification and impairment of obligations (Article 
XXIII). The two countries proposed that the GATT adopted new sanctions for legal violations, 
including both money compensation and collective retaliation by the contracting parties. 
Developed countries refused to include any of these proposals in Part IV, and the initiative 
resulted in only minor changes to the dispute settlement rules.27 
                                                                                                                                                              
been an essential element in the Brazilian strategy before the DSB [and that] the involvement of extra-
governmental actors, well managed, may contribute decisively to disseminate highly technical 
information among government officials and the involved industries, increasing [the Brazilian] ability 
before the DSB”. Cf. Marega (2006). 
27
 Abreu, 1998, p. 5. 
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Brazilian participation in trade disputes, during the GATT years, varied in scope and 
number. The most important issues were: 
(a) A claim from France related to the domestic tax on liquors that discriminated 
against French exports, in violation of the national treatment obligation of 
Article III. A working party report ruled that the measure was a violation of 
GATT, and the discrimination was eliminated a decade later.28 
(b) In 1953, Brazil filed a claim against the United States for failing to implement 
concessions promised in a previous negotiation. The concessions were 
implemented the following year.29 
(c) In 1962, Brazil charged the United Kingdom with proposing to increase the 
margin of preference in its tariff on bananas, in violation of the terms of a 
waiver permitting such increases. A panel ruled in favor of Brazil, and the 
proposed increase was abandoned. 30 
(d) In the 1970s, Brazil joined Australia in its claim that the EC system of 
payments to sugar importers violated Article XVI, causing the EC share of 
the world market to increase and seriously injure other exporters. EC 
legislation was modified after the panel found a violation.31 
(e) In 1980, Brazil proposed a claim against Spain, related to a higher domestic 
tax applicable on Arabic coffee, mostly exported by Brazil. The panel report 
recognized a de facto discrimination, favoring the Brazilian claim.32 
(f) In 1982, Brazil requested consultations with other contracting parties 
(Argentina, Colombia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, India, Nicaragua, Peru, 
Philippines and Australia) on EC sugar export subsidies.33 
(g) In 1986, Brazil requested consultations with the United States on ethyl 
alcohol. Due to the shortage in the product, Brazil did not pursue the case.34 
(h) (h) In 1988, Brazil requested consultations with the United States on the 
unfavorable impact of the U.S. Export Enhancement Program on Brazilian 
exports, particularly “regarding the damage being done to Brazilian exporters 
of soya-bean oil by U.S. Government funding of similar exports to the 
international market.”35 
(i) Brazil became more active in the 1990s, becoming the claimant in seven 
cases, all of them against the United States and the EC, and mostly related to 
pending disputes that were not being solved during the Uruguay Round: a 
complaint against EC anti-dumping measures involving cotton yarn;36 a 
                                                     
28
 Working Party Report, Brazilian Internal Taxes, GATT/CP.3/42 (First Report, 1949), BISD II/181; 
GATT/CP.5/37 (Second Report, 1950), BISD II/186. 
29
 Brazilian Compensatory Concessions. GATT Document SR.9/27 (1954). 
30
 GATT Document L/1749 (1962). 
31
 European Economic Community Export Refunds on Sugar. BISD, 27th , Supplement (1981), p. 69. 
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 GATT Document SCM/89 (1988). 
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 European Economic Community – Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton Yarn from 
Brazil, ADP/137 (1995). The panel did not found the violation claimed by Brazil. 
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complaint concerning United States’ quantitative restrictions on wool suits; a 
complaint against anti-dumping measures imposed by the United States on 
steel products; a complaint against the EC in respect to the compensation 
provided to the United States in the oilseeds case; and a challenge brought 
with ten other countries against U.S. internal measures favoring U.S. tobacco. 
In 1992, a GATT panel determined that the U.S. policy of providing different procedural 
treatment to parties to the Subsidies Code, compared to non-parties, violated Article I of the 
GATT.37 
In 1993, Brazil presented claims before the Anti-dumping Committee on the treatment by 
Mexico of Brazilian exports of electric power transformers.38 
Likewise, Brazil requested consultations on a case related to exports of wool suits to the 
United States. In both cases solutions were found without use of conventional dispute 
settlement.39 
In 1993, Brazil, along with Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Thailand, and 
Zimbabwe, complained against the United States on the enaction of a new law containing 
measures which favored American tobacco. Later on, Canada and Argentina also submitted 
claims, and a panel was established to examine all of the complaints. The panel found that some 
of the measures were inconsistent with Articles III.5 and III.2 of the GATT.40 
Complaints against Brazil in the 1980s were mainly from the United States: the dispute in 
1983 regarding poultry exports was solved by a market sharing agreement also involving the EC.  
In 1989, the United States complained about the Brazilian import licensing system,41 but 
the matter was solved with Brazil;s trade regime reform, post-March of 1990. 
There was a complaint against Brazil in 1992 by the EC due to Brazil’s imposition of 
subsidy countervailing duty on imports of milk powder and other milk types. In 1994 the panel 
findings were against Brazil and the duties were withdrawn.42 
Along the 1980s, other harsh disputes between Brazil and the United States were 
motivated by intellectual property issues, but not taken to the GATT. In 1987, the United States 
threatened retaliation against Brazilian exports, responding to the legislation on information 
technology. The threat was suspended after legal changes were proposed that would guarantee 
intellectual property rights on software.43 
The second dispute involved the imposition of surtaxes by the United States on Brazilian 
exports, as retaliation for poor protection of pharmaceutical patents. Brazil requested a panel, but 
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 United States—Denial of Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment as to Non-Rubber Footwear from Brazil. 
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the issue was solved bilaterally after the Brazilian government proposed new legislation 
recognizing intellectual property rights on pharmaceuticals.44 
This history of Brazilian participation in the GATT dispute settlement system 
demonstrates an increasing activism along the years, and especially during the Uruguay Round 
negotiations. This could be explained, probably, by the increasing relevance of trade for Brazil in 
those years. Also, trade disputes seemed an alternative to emphasizing some topics during the 
negotiation process. This strategy would be repeated later, during the Doha negotiations. 
B. Brazilian Disputes in MERCOSUR 
MERCOSUR had its origins in Brazil and Argentina’s drive for closer relations and political-
legal approximation, after the military regimes collapsed in these countries. In spite of the failure 
of prior ambitious experiences with integration, the Treaty of Asuncion (1991) created an even 
more ambitious Southern Common Market. 
That creation, then, has been most appropriately evaluated more as a hortatory document 
than an acute description of the objectives to be accomplished by the four countries in a short 
period of time.45 
These ambitious objectives proved unfeasible, for pragmatic reasons grounded in the 
contemporary history of the states political parties: political instability and cyclical economic 
crisis, the lack of coordination with subnational institutions, a time-consuming process for 
ratifying and incorporating MERCOSUR law into domestic law, inconsistent domestic political 
priorities, and insufficient time to coordinate efforts among government officials. 
From an economic viewpoint, MERCOSUR’s initial impulse was grounded in the 
increasing regional trade among the partners between 1991 and 1998. Trade, however, was frozen 
in 1998 as a result of Brazil’s currency crisis, which led to extreme financial instability in 
Argentina. In the domestic political debate, the Argentine criticism of its “Brazil-dependency” 
justified measures to protect its national industry. Several of these measures triggered the dispute 
settlement mechanism of MERCOSUR.46 
Notwithstanding the loss of political and economic relevance in recent years, 
MERCOSUR is still a mandatory topic of regional discourse, and the presidents of the four 
countries reinforce, from time to time, their commitment to the development of regional 
integration. The last concrete attempt to revamp MERCOSUR occurred in 2000, when the 
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 Treaty of Asunción, art. 1. All official documents related to MERCOSUR are available at 
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“MERCOSUR’s Relaunching Agenda” was approved. This agenda encompassed legal measures 
aimed at bringing greater stability to the process of regional integration.47 
Among the more important items on the “Relaunching Agenda” was the improvement of 
the dispute settlement system. The hope was to bring a higher legal density to the process, as well 
as solutions to procedural problems that occurred when the first cases were adjudicated in 
accordance with the procedures outlined in the Protocol of Brasilia. This norm was also a source 
for reviving the debate among academics about a stable and efficient structure for MERCOSUR’s 
dispute settlement system. 
In fact, since its very beginning, MERCOSUR faced a lively debate about the most 
effective structure for its dispute settlement system. The initial aspiration was to create a 
permanent system, to be adopted as soon as the transition to a common market was completed.48 
According to the original provision in the Treaty of Asuncion, the transition period would extend 
from 1991 to 1994. During the transition period, the Protocol of Brasilia would be applicable, 
until the permanent system could be in force.49 
A permanent supranational court is still missing, but the states’ parties signed, in 2002, 
the Protocol of Olivos, which reformed the dispute settlement system.50 According to the Protocol 
of Olivos, the dispute settlement system has jurisdiction over all the claims related to “the 
interpretation, application, and non-fulfillment” of MERCOSUR provisions.51 MERCOSUR 
provisions subjected to this process of dispute settlement included the Decisions of Council of the 
Common Market, the Resolutions of the Common Market Group, and the Directives of the 
MERCOSUR Trade Commission. The settlement process of the Protocol of Olivos developed the 
following steps for dispute resolution: (a) direct negotiations between the States Parties; (b) 
intervention of the Common Market Group, such intervention being non-mandatory and 
conditioned upon the request from a State Party; (c) ad hoc arbitration, with three arbitrators; (d) 
non-mandatory appeal to the Permanent Court of Review; (e) request for clarification, regarding 
any obscure meaning in the award; (f) compliance with the award by the State Party; (g) review 
of the compliance, if requested by the State favored by the award; (h) adoption of retaliatory 
measures by the favored State, in case of non-compliance; and (i) review of the retaliatory 
measures, if requested by the obliged State. 
The creation of the Permanent Court of Review was the main innovation brought by the 
Protocol of Olivos, if compared with the procedure existing when the Protocol of Brasilia was in 
force. This innovation attempts expressly to bring greater coherence to the judgments by ad hoc 
tribunals, because divergent interpretations were adopted by past decisions. 
A provision inserted in the Protocol of Olivos brings the possibility of choosing between 
the MERCOSUR dispute settlement system and another system eventually competent to solve the 
dispute. The rule stipulates that the complaining state may choose the forum, but once the 
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proceedings are initiated, that state may not re-litigate before the other forum.52 This rule 
becomes relevant if we notice that the MERCOSUR states parties participate, in an individual 
status, in other multilateral trade agreements with their own dispute settlement mechanisms.53 
Next, summaries of all the cases decided so far are presented:54 
(a) Case between Argentina and Brazil concerning Brazil’s application of restrictive 
measures to reciprocal trade with Argentina (1999) 
The first case brought to MERCOSUR involved a complaint by Argentina against 
Brazilian license requirements on imported lactate products. In a unanimous decision issued on 
April 28, 1999, the arbitral panel gave Brazil approximately seven months to eliminate all non-
automatic import license requirements not based on very limited exceptions.  
(b) Case concerning Brazil’s Subsidies on the Production and Export of Pork to 
Argentina (1999) 
Argentina lodged a complaint against Brazil, alleging that Brasilia was unfairly 
subsidizing exports of pork meat within MERCOSUR. The ad hoc arbitration panel, in an award 
made on December 27, 1999, found that the alleged Brazilian subsidized corn feed program that 
was at the root of Argentina’s complaint was not specifically directed at pork producers and, 
therefore, was not a type of subsidy expressly prohibited by either MERCOSUR or the WTO. 
Thus, by a unanimous vote, the panel rejected Argentina’s complaint relating to the financial 
mechanisms of advances on exchange contracts and export contracts applied by Brazil. 
(c) Case between Brazil and Argentina concerning safeguards measures for Brazil’s 
textiles (2000) 
This time, Brazil complained about an Argentinean safeguard measure that imposed 
annual quotas on Brazilian-made cotton textiles. On March 10, 2000, the arbitral panel dismissed 
Argentina’s argument that the panel did not have jurisdiction over the dispute and found that 
Argentina had imposed a safeguard measure that at the time was no longer permissible under 
MERCOSUR rules in the context of bilateral Argentine-Brazilian trade. The panel gave the 
Argentinean government fifteen days to abrogate its safeguard measure on Brazilian cotton 
textiles. 
(d) Case on the application of Argentina’s anti-dumping measures against Brazilian 
exports of poultry (2001) 
The action was brought by Brazil, alleging that Argentina’s imposition of an anti-
dumping duty on Brazilian whole chickens violated MERCOSUR rules concerning the 
investigation of unfair trade practices between member states and the subsequent imposition of 
anti-dumping measures. Although the ad hoc arbitration panel rejected the Argentine contention 
that it lacked jurisdiction over the dispute, it did find in favor of Argentina, alleging the absence 
of MERCOSUR norms that directly addressed the issues invoked in the case. 
The superficial analysis given by the arbitral panel was highly criticized. Later, Brazil 
brought the case before the DSB, and prevailed. This case was a landmark because it favored the 
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creation of a review body within MERCOSUR (consolidated in the Protocol of Olivos) and 
created the rule of choice of one exclusive international forum, mentioned above. 
(e) Case between Uruguay and Argentina on Argentina’s restrictions of access to the 
market of bicycles imported from Uruguay (2001) 
Uruguay complained that Argentinean customs authorities’ determination of the value of 
imported bicycles implied a violation of the regime of dispatch and valuation of goods adopted by 
MERCOSUR. The arbitral panel issued a unanimous decision in favor of Uruguay, declaring that 
Argentina’s blanket treatment of Uruguayan bicycles made by one company as non-MERCOSUR 
in origin and therefore subject to the common external tariff or CET, violated Argentina’s 
MERCOSUR obligations.  
(f) Case between Uruguay and Brazil on the import of remolded tires from Uruguay 
(2002) 
A sixth arbitral award was issued on January 9, 2002, in a matter brought by Uruguay, 
alleging that a Brazilian law enacted in September of 2000, which prohibited the issuance of 
import licenses for remolded tires, violated a July of 2000 MERCOSUR standstill prohibition on 
new restrictions to intraregional trade flows. In reaching its decision, the arbitration panel 
reasoned that Brazil was stopped from claiming that an earlier 1991 law was intended to include 
remolded tires as “used” tires, whose importation into Brazil from that date forward was 
prohibited. Thus, the panel ruled in favor of Uruguay, and Brazil was ordered to issue domestic 
legislation lifting the ban on imported remolded tires within 60 days. 
(g) Case between Argentina and Brazil on barriers to entrance of Argentinean 
phytosanitary products in Brazil (2002) 
The case was brought by Argentina against Brazil for failure to incorporate into its 
domestic legal framework five Common Market Group Resolutions that are intended to create a 
streamlined phytosanitary system for evaluating and registering foodstuffs and facilitating their 
commerce among the four MERCOSUR countries. Although the arbitral panel recognized that 
the five Common Market Group Resolutions in question did not contain explicit time limits for 
incorporating them into domestic law, relevant international law principles obligated Brazil to 
incorporate them within “a reasonable period of time.”  Given that six years had elapsed since the 
first of these resolutions were issued (and that all three other MERCOSUR countries had already 
incorporated them), Brazil’s inaction was found to be unreasonable, and the Brazilians were 
ordered to implement the resolutions within 120 days. 
(h) Case between Paraguay and Uruguay on the application of a specific Uruguayan 
internal tax on the sale of Paraguayan cigarettes (2002) 
For the first time, a complaint was brought by Paraguay, over Uruguay’s discriminatory 
imposition of its specific internal tax (impuesto específico interno — IMESI) on imported 
cigarettes versus domestic cigarettes, further distinguished, depending upon whether the 
cigarettes came from countries that directly bordered Uruguay (Argentina and Brazil). The 
Paraguayan government claimed that the different methodologies for calculating the IMESI 
created an impermissible nontariff barrier. The arbitral panel found the entire Uruguayan scheme 
discriminatory and in violation of the principle of national treatment found not only in 
MERCOSUR, but also in Latin American Integration Association (ALADI) and the WTO. The 
Uruguayan government was given six months to calculate the value of cigarettes from within 
MERCOSUR for purposes of imposing the IMESI, using the same methodology for calculating 
the value of domestic cigarettes. 
(i) Case between Argentina and Uruguay concerning wool export incentives (2003) 
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In April of 2002, Argentina presented a complaint against the Uruguayan regime of 
incentives for the industrial treatment of wool products. The panel decided that the Uruguayan 
regulation was incompatible with MERCOSUR regulations, and should be revoked in fifteen 
days.  
(j) Case between Uruguay and Brazil concerning discriminatory measures against 
Uruguay’s tobacco and tobacco-related products (2005) 
Uruguay complained that a Brazilian decree would raise to 150% the tariff applicable to 
all imports of tobacco and related products. Later, Brazil informed the panel that the decree had 
been unilaterally revoked. With the Uruguayan approval, the panel extinguished the dispute. 
(k) Case concerning the Argentinean prohibition of remolded tires from Uruguay (2005) 
In the first case brought within the Protocol of Olivos, Uruguay presented a claim against 
the Argentinean prohibition of imported remolded tires. Initially, the case was decided by an 
arbitral panel, which sustained the Argentinean regulations, based on the reasoning that estoppel 
was not identifiable in the situation. The Permanent Court of Review, however, found that the 
panel had incurred “evident and serious legal errors,” because the Argentinean regulations were 
incompatible with MERCOSUR principles.55 
(l) Case concerning the Uruguayan complaint against the blockage of international 
bridges (2006) 
This case is actually a consequence of the dispute between Argentina and Uruguay 
regarding the building of two industrial paper mills on the left margin of the Uruguay River. A 
related case, based on the Treaty of the Uruguay River, had been filed by Argentina before the 
International Court of Justice.56 
In the case before MERCOSUR, Uruguay complained that Argentinean authorities had 
neglected its responsibilities to guarantee free access to the bridges over the Uruguay River, an 
essential path for Uruguayan exports. The arbitral panel, in the first instance, concluded that the 
Argentinean authorities did not adopt the “due behavior” in order to guarantee free access for 
Uruguayan transporters (without, however, making Argentina pay damages or reparation). 
In the case before MERCOSUR, Uruguay complained that Argentinean authorities had 
neglected its responsibilities to guarantee free access to the bridges over the Uruguay River, an 
essential path for Uruguayan exports. The arbitral panel, in the first instance, concluded that the 
Argentinean authorities did not adopt the “due behavior” in order to guarantee free access for 
Uruguayan transporters (without, however, making Argentina pay damages or reparation). 
(m) Permanent Court of Review: Opinion 01/2007 
For the first time, the member states petitioned the Court to issue an opinion on the 
applicability of MERCOSUR law (in this case, the Buenos Aires Protocol on the Jurisdiction over 
International Contracts). The original case, before a Paraguayan domestic court, involved a 
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contractual dispute between an Argentinean and Paraguayan companies. In a grandiose opinion, 
the Court decided that MERCOSUR law should prevail over domestic regulations, besides 
clarifying its interpretation of how to apply the regional agreements. 
After this overview of the MERCOSUR dispute settlement system, some inferences may 
be extracted thus far. Firstly, the relatively low number of cases solved by litigation should not 
imply that the number of disputes is proportionally low. In fact, most disputes were solved by 
negotiation between MERCOSUR partners, especially before the MERCOSUR Trade 
Commission. Hence, the low number of arbitrated decisions has been praised as a feature of 
“flexible character” of the system. 
Secondly, the level of compliance has been remarkable. According to Bertoni (2006), all 
decisions have been complied with, which is a sign that MERCOSUR member states respect to 
the judgments. This cooperation grants credibility and legal certainty to the process. 57 
Yet, Brazil was involved in seven of the cases. This is not surprising, once one considers 
the prevalence of the Brazilian economy in regional trade flows. Nevertheless, the cases 
involving Brazil have been conducted, and decided, according to the Protocol of Brasilia. Its 
performance at the Permanent Court of Review has yet to be seen. 
C. Brazilian Disputes at the WTO 
The WTO dispute settlement system has been regularly praised as the jewel in the Uruguay 
Round crown. Especially in the first years after Marrakesh, there was a deep enthusiasm about the 
higher dose of legalism in the resolution of trade disputes. Innovations such as the appellate 
review, strict time frames, and the practical extinction of the blockade of panel decisions, were 
seen as important steps towards more predictability in the trade jungle.58 
A decade of experience chilled some of these aspirations, once procedural issues and the 
practical hindrances for developing countries became more apparent. Thus, an improvement of 
the system was recognized as necessary by the Doha Development Agenda,59 in 2002. 
Nevertheless, the WTO dispute settlement system has become the most used mechanism in the 
history of public international adjudication. The explanation, according to Palmeter (2006), may 
be found in “the confidence in the integrity of the system and the competence of those who 
administer it; the limited subject matter jurisdiction (trade and commerce, not war and peace); 
and a remedy that, historically, has been justified simply as an attempt to rebalance concessions 
and restore the status quo”.60 
As noted before, Brazil has been actively involved in the disputes, being a claimant in 22 
cases and a respondent in 14 of them. As seen in the charts below, Brazilian participation has 
been constant since 1995, with remarkable activism between 2000 and 2002. In fact, in 2000, a 
quarter of the complaints were presented by Brazil. Two hypotheses may explain the emphasis on 
these years. On one hand, the devaluation of Brazilian currency in 1998 prompted many industrial 
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sectors to complain with the government on increasing barriers in exporting markets. On the other 
hand, at the beginning of the decade the institutional elements identified above were present, 
including the capacity of government officials dedicated to trade disputes and the organized 
pressure from industrial lobbies. 
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GRAPH 2 
BRAZIL PARTICIPATION IN THE DSB  








All cases involving Brazil 8.00% 10.26% 12.00% 4.87% 3.33% 26.47% 21.74% 13.51% 0.00% 0.00% 8.33% 5.00% 0.00% 9.92%
Brazil as claimant 4.00% 0.00% 8.00% 2.43% 0.00% 20.59% 17.39% 13.51% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 6.06%
Brazil as respondent 4% 10.26% 4.00% 2.43% 3.33% 5.88% 4.35% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 8.33% 5.00% 0.00% 3.87%
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Total of cases in the DSB 25 39 50 41 30 34 23 37 26 19 12 20 7 363
Brazil as claimant 1 0 4 1 0 7 4 5 0 0 0 0 0 22
Brazil as respondent 1 4 2 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 14
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007* TOTAL
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A related question, regarding the level of Brazilian participation at the DSB, concerns the 
rate of success as the claimant. Arguably, one could say that the rate of success may serve as an 
incentive for presenting new cases, either because government officials learn positively from the 
experience, or because the victory has a demonstration effect for other national industries affected 
by similar trade barriers. If this assumption is correct, the positive results obtained by Brazil can 
also be mentioned as a factor for more audacity in new cases. The data so far shows that Brazil 
obtained full or partial victories in 11 cases, whereas in two of them an agreement was reached 
with the respondent. Nine cases did not reach a decision, mostly because parties agreed to 
suspend the procedure. 
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GRAPH 4 
RESULTS OF CASES FROM BRAZIL’S PERSPECTIVE 










  Source: WTO (data until May 2007).  
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Even when Brazil was on the other side of the bench, the WTO dispute settlement system 
has not brought any catastrophic result. In fact, most cases against Brazil did not reach a panel 
decision. That can be explained by the fact that some measures challenged before the WTO were 
temporary, such as the transitional subsidies for the automobile sector in the late 1990s. Thus, 
complainants lacked incentives for engaging in complex litigation at the DSB only for a matter of 
principle. Following the previous reasoning, these results lead to a perception within the Brazilian 
trade community that the system is fair and equitable, as opposed to the recurring accusations of 
judicial activism that are found in the United States. 
GRAPH 5 
RESULTS OF CASES FROM BRAZIL’S PERSPECTIVES 











  Source: WTO (data until May 2007) 
  *Favorable includes fully and partially favorable 
 
Not surprisingly, many complaints against Brazil invoked the Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Duties (SCM) and the Trade Related Investment Measures Agreement 
(TRIMS). Two reasons may be presented for these claims. On one hand, they were international 
reactions against the reappearance of industrial policies based on subsidies to attract new plants. 
On the other, some of the challenged measures were related to pre-WTO legislation that had not 
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Considering the Brazilian activism at the DSB, a legitimate question is whether the 
complaints do not prompt the respondents to reciprocate with claims against Brazil, in a natural 
“tu quoque” reaction. The analysis of the cases, however, does not provide any indication that 
could support this correlation. The filing and the issues presented against Brazil seem 
disconnected with previous claims presented to the DSB. 
On exception could be the EC-Sugar case, commented below. After Brazil presented the 
claim, the OECD (impelled by France) began a long study on the Brazilian agricultural markets, 
looking with detailed attention for subsidies granted to local producers. Nevertheless, the 
conclusion of this study only confirmed the outstanding efficiency of Brazilian farmers and the 
low level of subsidies when compared to the OECD members.61 Without a case in the agricultural 
sector, rumor has it that the EC looked for any case against Brazil, and filed the controversial 
claim against the ban on the importation of retreaded tires.62 Whether the motivation for the latter 
claim was to counteract Brazilian activism will most probably be an unanswered speculative 
question. For the proposals of this paper, it is adequate to say that a definite correlation between 
claims and respondents´ reciprocal claims could not be found. 
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Once the general features of Brazilian participation were presented, the cases are 
summarized in the next pages. 
1. Cases as respondent 
DS22: Brazil — Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut (Brazil – Desicated Coconuts) 
The Philippines requested consultations with Brazil (on November 27th, 1995) regarding 
a countervailing duty imposed by Brazil on the Philippine’s exports of desiccated coconut. The 
Philippines claimed that this duty was inconsistent with WTO and GATT rules. A panel was 
established in March of 1996 with Canada, the EC, Indonesia, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, and the 
United States as third-parties. The Panel Report (dated October 17th, 1996) concluded that the 
provisions of the agreements relied on by the claimant were not applicable to the dispute. The 
Philippines appealed, but the AB Report upheld the Panel’s decision.  
DS30: Brazil — Countervailing Duties on Imports of Desiccated Coconut and Coconut 
Milk Powder from Sri Lanka 
Sri Lanka requested consultations with Brazil (on February 23rd, 1996) concerning the 
Brazil’s imposition of countervailing duties on Sri Lanka’s export of desiccated coconut and 
coconut milk powder. Sri Lanka alleged that those measures were inconsistent with GATT 
Articles I, II and VI and Article 13(a) of the Agriculture Agreement (the so-called peace clause). 
No panel was established, nor was a settlement announced. 
DS46: Brazil — Export Financing Programme for Aircraft (Brazil – Aircraft) 
Canada requested consultations with Brazil (on June 19th, 1996) based on Article 4 of the 
Subsidies Agreement, which provides for special procedures for export subsidies. Canada 
claimed that export subsidies granted under the Brazilian Programa de Financiamento às 
Exportações (PROEX) to foreign purchasers of Brazil’s Embraer aircraft were inconsistent with 
the Subsidies Agreement Articles 3, 27.4 and 27.5. A Panel was established on July 23rd, 1998. 
The Panel Report (April 14th, 1999) found that the Brazilian measures were inconsistent with 
Articles 3.1(a) and 27.4 of the Subsidies Agreement. Brazil appealed. The AB Report (August 
2nd, 1999) upheld all the findings of the Panel.  
On November 23rd, 1999, Canada requested the establishment of a panel under Article 
21.5 of the DSU, arguing that Brazil had not taken measures to comply fully with the rulings and 
recommendations of the DSB. The compliance panel report (May 9th, 2000) decided that the 
Brazilian measures were not consistent with the Subsidies Agreement. In reaching this 
conclusion, the panel notably rejected Brazil's defense that PROEX payments were allowed under 
item (k) of Annex I of the Subsidies Agreement. Brazil appealed. The AB Report (July 21st,2000) 
maintained the panel’s conclusion that Brazil had failed to implement the recommendation of the 
DSB and that payments made under the revised PROEX are prohibited by Article 3 of the 
Subsidies Agreement and are not justified under item (k) of the Illustrative List of the same 
Agreement. The Appellate Body therefore upheld the review panel's conclusion that Brazil has 
failed to implement the recommendations of the DSB. A new panel reported (on July 26th 2001) 
that PROEX III was not inconsistent with Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement, that PROEX III 
as such is justified under the second paragraph of item (k) of the Illustrative List of Export 
Subsidies of Annex I of the SCM Agreement, and that PROEX III cannot be justified under 
paragraph 1 of this item. 
DS51: Brazil — Certain Automotive Investment Measures 
Japan requested consultations with Brazil (July 30th,1996) concerning certain automotive 
investment measures taken by the Brazilian government, arguing that they violated TRIMs 
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Agreement Article 2, GATT Articles I:1, III:4 and XI:1, as well as the Subsidies Agreement 
Articles 3, 27.2 and 27.4. Also, Japan made a non-violation complaint under GATT Article 
XXIII:1(b). No Panel was established and no settlement was announced. 
DS52: Brazil — Certain Measures Affecting Trade and Investment in the Automotive 
Sector 
The United States requested consultations with Brazil (August 9th, 1996) concerning the 
same measures as identified in Japan’s request in WT/DS51. Moreover, the United States also 
made a non-violation claim under GATT Article XXIII:1(b). No panel was established and no 
settlement was announced.  
DS65: Brazil — Certain Measures Affecting Trade and Investment in the Automotive 
Sector 
The United States requested consultations with Brazil (January 10th, 1997) concerning 
roughly the same measures as in WT/DS52, although they also included, in this request, measures 
adopted by Brazil subsequent to consultations held with the United States pursuant to the request 
under WT/DS52, which included measures conferring benefits to certain companies located in 
Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the EC. The United States alleged violations under Articles I:1 
and III:4 of GATT 1994, Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement, and Articles 3 and 27.4 of the SCM 
Agreement. The United States also made a nullification and impairment of benefits claim under 
Article XXIII:1(b) of GATT 1994. No panel was established and no settlement was announced. 
DS81: Brazil — Measures Affecting Trade and Investment in the Automotive Sector 
The EC requested consultations with Brazil (May 7th, 1997) concerning certain measures 
in the trade and investment in the automotive sector implemented by Brazil, including in 
particular, Law No. 9440/1997, Law No. 9449/1997, and Decree No. 1987/1996. The EC argued 
that these measures violate Articles I:1 and III:4 of GATT 1994, Articles 3, 5 and 27.4 of the 
Subsidies Agreement, and Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement. In addition, the EC claimed for 
nullification and impairment of benefits under both GATT 1994 and the Subsidies Agreement. 
No panel was established and no settlement was announced. 
DS116: Brazil — Measures Affecting Payment Terms for Imports 
The EC requested consultations with Brazil (January 9th 1998) in respect to measures 
affecting payment terms for imports allegedly introduced by the Central Bank of Brazil. EC 
contended that these measures violated Articles 3 and 5 of the Agreement on Import Licensing 
Procedures. No panel was established and no settlement was announced.  
DS183: Brazil — Measures on Import Licensing and Minimum Import Prices 
The EC requested consultations (October 14th, 1999) regarding a number of Brazilian 
measures, especially Brazil’s non-automatic licensing system and the minimum pricing practice, 
which allegedly restricted EC exports — notably of textile products, Sorbitol and 
Carboxymethylcellulose (CMC). EC claimed that those measures violated Articles II, VIII, X and 
XI of the GATT 1994; Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture; Articles 1, 3, 5 and 8 of the 
Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures; and Articles 1 through 7 of the Agreement on 
Implementation of Article VII of the GATT 1994. No panel was established and no settlement 
was announced. 
DS197: Brazil — Measures on Minimum Import Prices 
The United States requested consultations with Brazil (May 30th, 2000) concerning the 
practice of minimum import prices for customs valuation purposes, established by Decree No. 
2.498/98 and other statutes and regulations. The United States contended that Brazil used this 
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verification system, along with non-automatic import licensing procedures, to prohibit or restrict 
the import of products with declared values below arbitrarily determined minimum prices. The 
United States considered that Brazil’s measures were inconsistent with its obligations under 
Articles 1 through 7, and 12 of the Customs Valuation Agreement; general notes 1, 2 and 4 of 
Annex 1 of the Customs Valuation Agreement; Articles II and XI of the GATT 1994; Articles 1 
and 3 of the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures; Articles 2 and 7 of the Agreement on 
Textiles and Clothing; and Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture. No panel was established 
and no settlement was announced.  
DS199: Brazil — Measures Affecting Patent Protection (Brazil – Patent Protection) 
The United States requested consultations with Brazil (May 30th, 2000) in respect to 
certiain provisions of Brazilian Industrial Property Law (Law N. 9.279/1996) and other related 
measures, which established a “local element” requirement for the protection of exclusive patent 
rights. The United States argued that the “local element” requirement could only be satisfied with 
local production of the patented subject matter. The United States also added that Brazil’s “local 
element” requirement stipulated that a patent should be subject to compulsory licensing if the 
subject matter of the patent is not assembled in Brazilian territory. The United States further 
noted that Brazil explicitly defines “failure to be assembled” as “failure to manufacture or 
incomplete manufacture of the product” or “failure to make full use of the patented process.” The 
United States considered such a requirement to be inconsistent with Brazil’s obligations under 
Articles 27 and 28 of the TRIPS Agreement, and Article III of the GATT 1994. A Panel was 
established on February 1st, 2001, with Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, India, and 
Japan as third-parties. An agreement was reached by the parties on July 5th, 2001. 
DS229: Brazil — Anti-Dumping Duties on Jute Bags from India 
India requested consultations with Brazil (April 9th 2001) concerning: the determination 
by Brazil to continue imposing anti-dumping duties on jute bags and bags made of jute yarn from 
India; Brazil´s refusal to reconsider the decision to continue anti-dumping duties on Indian jute 
products; the non-consideration of the fresh evidence regarding cost of production, domestic sales 
prices, and export prices of Indian jute manufacturers, and refusal to initiate review of the 
decision to impose anti-dumping duties; the Brazilian general anti-dumping practice. According 
to India, the Brazilian anti-dumping rules are inconsistent with Articles VI and X of GATT 1994; 
Articles 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 (especially 6.6, 6.7, 6.8 and Annex II, 6.9, 6.10), 11, 12, 17.6(i), 18.3, 18.4; 
and Article XVI of the WTO Agreement. No panel was established and no settlement was 
announced. 
DS332: Brazil — Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tires (Brazil – Retreaded Tires) 
The EC requested consultations (June 20th, 2005) with Brazil on the imposition of 
measures that adversely affect exports of retreaded tires from the EC to the Brazilian market. The 
EC considers that these measures were inconsistent with Brazil’s obligations under Articles I:1, 
III:4, XI:1 and XIII:1 of the GATT 1994. Panel established on January 20th 2006, with 
Argentina, Australia, Japan, Korea and the United States originally as third-parties (China, Cuba, 
Guatemala, Mexico, Paraguay, Chinese Taipei, and Thailand later joined as third-parties). The 
Panel completed its work in June 2007, allowing the Brazilian measure, but recommending 
adaptations to put it in conformity with the WTO provisions. 
DS355: Brazil — Anti-dumping Measures on Imports of Certain Resins from Argentina 
Argentina requested consultations (December 26th, 2006) with Brazil concerning anti-
dumping measures applied by Brazil to imports of certain polyethylene terephthalate (PET) resins 
from Argentina. Argentina considers that the anti-dumping investigation, the determination made, 
and the duties imposed by Brazil were inconsistent with at least Article VI of GATT 1994 and 
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Articles 2.2.1, 2.2.1.1, 2.2.2, 2.4, 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 6, 8, 10, and 12 and Annex II of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement. Also, the request for consultations concerns Articles 2 (XV) and 5 §3 of 
Decree 4.732/2003, which Argentina considers inconsistent with Article XVI:4 of the WTO 
Agreement, with Article X of GATT 1994 and Articles 6.14, 10, and 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement. Finally, the request for consultations concerned Article 58 of Decree 1.602/1995, 
which Argentina claims to be inconsistent with Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement, Article X 
of GATT 1994, and Articles 9 and 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. In May of 2007, 
Argentina formally requested a panel, after a negotiated solution was not reached during the 
consultations. 
2. Cases as complainant 
DS 4: United States — Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline 
Venezuela requested consultations on January 24th, 1995 and Brazil on April 10th, 1995, 
alleging that a U.S. gasoline regulation discriminated against its gasoline exports, in violation of 
GATT Articles I and III and Article 2 of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). 
Two panels were established (April 10th, 1995 for Venezuela and June 19th, 1995 for Brazil). On 
May 31st, 1995, according to Article 9 of the DSU, the two complaints were merged into a single 
panel. The panel report (January 29th, 1996) found the regulation to be inconsistent with GATT 
Article III:4 and not to benefit from an Article XX exception. The United States appealed on 
February 21st, 1996. The Appellate Body report (April 22nd, 1996) modified the panel report on 
the interpretation of GATT Article XX(g), but concluded that the U.S. regulation was not 
compatible with the WTO principles. The United States announced the implementation of the 
DSB recommendations on August 19th, 1997. 
DS 69: European Communities — Measures Affecting Importation of Certain Poultry 
Products (EC- Poultry) 
Brazil requested consultations with the EC (February 24th, 1997) in respect to the EC 
regime for the importation of certain poultry products and the implementation by the EC of the 
Tariff Rate Quota for these products. Brazil argued that the EC measures were inconsistent with 
Articles X and XXVII of GATT 1994 and Articles 1 and 3 of the Agreement on Import Licensing 
Procedure. Also, Brazil contended that the measures nullified or impaired benefits accruing to it 
directly or indirectly under GATT 1994. A panel was established on August 11th, 1997. Thailand 
and the United States. participated as third-parties. The Panel report (March 12th, 1998) found 
that Brazil had not demonstrated that the EC had failed to implement and administer the tariff rate 
quota for poultry in line with its obligations under the cited agreements. Brazil appealed. The 
report of the Appellate Body (July 13th, 1998) upheld most of the Panel's findings and 
conclusions, but reversed the Panel's finding that the EC had acted inconsistently with Article 
5.1(b) of the Agreement on Agriculture. The Appellate Body, however, concluded that the EC 
had acted inconsistently with Article 5.5 of the Agreement on Agriculture. Afterwards, the EC 
and Brazil announced (October 21st, 1998) that they had reached an agreement on a reasonable 
period of time for implementation, until March 1999. 
DS70: Canada — Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft (Canada – Aircraft) 
Brazil requested consultations with Canada (March 10th, 1997) regarding certain 
subsidies granted by the Government of Canada or its provinces intended to support the export of 
civilian aircraft. Brazil argued that these measures were inconsistent with Article 3 of the 
Subsidies Agreement. Panel established on July 23rd. 1998. The United States participated as 
third-party. The panel report (April of 1999) found that certain of Canada’s measures were 
inconsistent with Articles 3.1(a) and 3.2 of the Subsidies Agreement, but rejected Brazil’s claim 
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that EDC assistance to the Canadian regional aircraft industry constitutes export subsidies. 
Canada appealed. The Appellate Body upheld the findings of the panel (August of 1999).  
On November 23rd, 1999, Brazil requested the establishment of a panel under Article 
21.5 arguing that Canada had not taken measures to comply fully with the rulings and 
recommendations of the DSB. Australia, the EC and the United States participated as third-
parties. The panel compliance report (May of 2000) found that Canada had implemented the 
recommendation of the DSB, once Canada had withdrawn the  Technology Partnership Canada 
(TPC) assistance to the Canadian regional aircraft industry within 90 days, but that Canada had 
failed to implement the recommendation to withdraw the Canada Account Assistance to the 
Canadian regional aircraft industry. Brazil appealed (May of 2000) certain issues of law and legal 
interpretations developed by the compliance panel. The Appellate Body (July of 2000) found that 
the review panel erred in declining to examine one of Brazil’s arguments to the effect that the 
revised TPC program was inconsistent with Article 3.1(a) of the Subsidies Agreement, and also 
found that Brazil had failed to establish that the revised TPC program was inconsistent with 
Article 3.1(a) of the Subsidies Agreement. Accordingly, the AB found that Brazil had failed to 
establish that Canada has not implemented the recommendations of the DSB. Canada agreed to 
implement the recommendations of the DSB in respect to the Canada Account Program. 
DS71: Canada — Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft 
Brazil requested consultations with Canada (March 10th, 1997) concerning the same 
measures complained of DS70, but this time in reference to Article 7 of the Subsidies Agreement. 
It argued that the Canadian measures were actionable subsidies within the meaning of Part III of 
the Subsidies Agreement, and caused adverse effects within the meaning of Article 5 of the 
Agreement. No panel was established and no settlement was announced. 
DS112: Peru — Countervailing Duty Investigation against Imports of Buses from Brazil 
Brazil requested consultations with Peru (December 23rd, 1997) regarding a 
countervailing duty investigation against imports of buses from Brazil. Brazil argued that the 
procedures followed by the Peruvian authorities to initiate this investigation were against Articles 
11 and 13.1 of the Subsidies Agreement. No panel was established and no settlement was 
announced. 
DS154: European Communities — Measures Affecting Differential and Favorable  
 Treatment of Coffee 
Brazil requested consultations with the EC (December 7th, 1998) in respect of the special 
preferential treatment under the EC Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). Brazil asserted 
that the EC GSP scheme favored products originating in the Andean countries and Central 
America that were conducting programs to combat drug production and trafficking. Brazil argued 
that this special treatment adversely affects the importation into the EC market of soluble coffee 
originating in Brazil and contended that this special treatment was inconsistent with the Enabling 
Clause, as well as with Article I of GATT 1994. Brazil further alleged that this special treatment 
nullifies or impairs benefits accruing to Brazil directly or indirectly under the cited provisions. No 
panel was established and no settlement was announced. 
DS190: Argentina — Transitional Safeguard Measures on Certain Imports of Woven Fabric 
Products of Cotton and Cotton Mixtures Originating in Brazil (Argentina – Cotton) 
Brazil requested a panel (February 11th, 2000) regarding restrictions imposed by 
Argentina on certain imports of woven fabrics of cotton and cotton mixtures originating in Brazil. 
Brazil argued that the transitional safeguards applied by Argentina were inconsistent with the 
country’s obligations under Articles 2.4, 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, 6.7, 6.8, 6.11, 8.9, and 8.10 of the 
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Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) and should, therefore, be revoked. Following Article 
6.11 of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, Brazil had referred the matter to the Textiles 
Monitoring Body (TMB) for review and recommendations, which conducted a review of the 
measures implemented by Argentina, and recommended that Argentina rescind the safeguard 
measures applied against imports from Brazil. Nevertheless, the matter remained unresolved. The 
DSB established a panel in March of 2000. The EC, Pakistan, Paraguay, and the United States 
joined as third-parties. In a communication in June of 2000, Brazil and Argentina notified a 
mutually agreed solution to this dispute. 
DS208: Turkey — Anti-Dumping Duty on Steel and Iron Pipe Fittings 
Brazil requested consultations with Turkey (October 9th, 2000) in respect to the anti-
dumping duty on steel and iron pipe fittings from Brazil. Brazil believed that Turkey authorities 
failed to ensure proper notifications in this case, that its establishment of the facts was not proper, 
and that its evaluation of the facts was not unbiased nor objective. Thus, Brazil argued that 
Turkey has acted inconsistently with Article VI of the GATT 1994 and Articles 2, 3, 5, 6, 12, and 
15 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. No panel was established and no settlement was announced. 
DS209: European Communities — Measures Affecting Soluble Coffee 
In October of 2000, Brazil requested consultations with the EC regarding measures 
applied under the EC Generalized System of Preferences scheme (GSP) that affect imports of 
soluble coffee originating in Brazil. These measures included the “graduation mechanism,” which 
progressively and selectively reduces or eliminates preferences granted to specific products 
and/or beneficiary countries under the GSP scheme, and the “drugs regime,” which confers 
preferential treatment for products originating in the Andean and Central American countries that 
are conducting a campaign to combat drugs. Brazil argued that the EC legislation that established 
the special treatment adversely affected the importation of soluble coffee originating in Brazil. 
Brazil alleged that these measures were inconsistent with the obligations of the EC under the 
Enabling Clause and under Article I of GATT 1994. No panel was established and no settlement 
was announced. 
DS216: Mexico — Provisional Anti-Dumping Measure on Electric Transformers 
Brazil requested consultations with Mexico (December 20th, 2000) regarding a 
provisional anti-dumping measure on electronic transformers from Brazil. Brazil considered that 
the above determination and the resulting provisional measures were inconsistent with Mexican 
obligations under the Anti-dumping Agreement (AD) and the GATT 1994, in particular, with 
Articles 5.2, 5.3, 5.8, 6.8, 7.1(i), 7.1(ii) and Annex II of the AD Agreement. No panel was 
established and no settlement was announced. 
DS217: United States — Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (US –  
 Offset Act, Byrd Amendment)  
The complainants (Australia, Brazil, Chile, European Communities, India, Indonesia, 
Japan, Korea, and Thailand) requested consultations on December 21st, 2000 with the United 
States concerning the amendment to the Tariff Act of 1930. Complainants argued that the 
amendment was inconsistent with the obligations of the United States under several provisions of 
the GATT, the AD Agreement, the SCM Agreement, and the WTO Agreement. A panel was 
established in July of 2001, with Argentina, Canada, Costa Rica, Hong Kong, China, Israel, 
Norway, and Mexico as third-parties. The Panel concluded (September of 2002) that the the Byrd 
Amendment was inconsistent with Articles 5.4, 18.1, and 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, 
Articles 11.4, 32.1, and 32.5 of the Subsidies Agreement, Articles VI:2 and VI:3 of the GATT 
1994, and Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement. The United States appealed. The Appellate 
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Body, in January of 2003, upheld some of the Panel’s findings and rejected others, but generally 
found the Byrd Amendment inconsistent with the SCM and the GATT 1994 agreements.  
Later, complainants requested arbitration, under article 21.3 of the DSU, to determine a 
reasonable period of time for the implementation of the DSB recommendations. Following the 
non-compliance, the countries, including Brazil, asked for authorization to suspend concessions, 
which was granted. In February of 2006, the United States enacted a new Deficit Reduction Act, 
to be in force in 2007, and stated that it complied with the WTO ruling.  
DS218: United States — Countervailing Duties on Certain Carbon Steel Products from  
 Brazil 
Brazil requested consultations with the United States in December of 2000, concerning 
certain aspects of United States countervailing duty practice and the imposition of countervailing 
duties on certain carbon steel products originating in Brazil. More specifically, Brazil is 
concerned with the United States’ practice of applying its countervailing duty laws by finding that 
privatized companies benefited from pre-privatization subsidies, and the unwillingness of the 
United States to bring its practice into conformity with the SCM Agreement. Brazil believed that 
the findings, that three companies were benefiting from subsidies conceded prior to their 
privatization, were a breach of Articles 1.1(b), 10, 14, 19, and 21 of the SCM Agreement. Also, 
Brazil believed that the decision not to terminate the investigation was in breach of Article 11.9 
of the SCM Agreement. No panel was established and no settlement was announced. 
DS219: European Communities — Anti-Dumping Duties on Malleable Cast Iron Tube or 
                           Pipe Fittings from Brazil (EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings) 
Brazil requested consultations on December 21st, 2000, with the EC concerning 
definitive anti-dumping duties imposed by Council Regulation (EC) No. 1784/2000 concerning 
imports of malleable cast iron tube or pipe fittings originating, inter alia, in Brazil. Brazil argued 
that the establishment of the facts was not proper and that EC´s evaluation of these facts was not 
unbiased and objective. Brazil considered that the EC had violated Article VI of GATT 1994 and 
Articles 1, 2, 3, 4 ,5 , 6, 7, 9, 11, 12 and 15 of the Anti-dumping Agreement. A panel was 
established in July of 2001, when Chile, Japan, Mexico and the United States joined as third-
parties. The panel report (March, 2003) concluded that the EC had acted inconsistently  in 
Articles 2.4.2, 12.2, and 12.2.2 of the AD, but also ruled against other claims presented by Brazil. 
Brazil appealed. The AB Report (July, 2003) rejected six of the seven Brazilian claims and found 
that the EC acted inconsistently with Articles 6.2 and 6.4 of the AD. In March of 2004, the EC 
informed that it had fully complied with the DSB recommendations. Brazil contested this claim. 
EC urged Brazil to prove that it had not fully complied with the DSB recommendations.  
DS222: Canada — Export Credits and Loan Guarantees for Regional Aircraft (Canada – 
Aircraft Credits and Guarantees) 
Brazil requested consultations with Canada (January 22nd, 2001) regarding subsidies 
which are allegedly being granted to Canada’s regional aircraft industry. Brazil argued that 
Canada was providing export credits and loan guarantees to its aircraft industry, which it 
understood were subsidies within the meaning of Article 1 of the SCM Agreement. The panel was 
established on March 12th, 2001 with Australia, the EC, India, and the United States as third-
parties. The Panel report (January 28th, 2002) rejected most of Brazil’s claims, but indeed found 
some Canadian conducts to be characterized as subsidies. Thus, the Panel recommended that 
Canada should withdraw the subsidies within 90 days. Canada did not fulfill its obligation; Brazil 
requested authorization to suspend concessions. Canada and Brazil reached an agreement. Canada 
breached the agreement and, afterwards, Brazil requested authorization to suspend concessions, 
which was granted by the DSB (although at a lower value than that requested by Brazil). 
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DS224: United States — U.S. Patents Code 
Brazil requested consultations with the United States (January 31st, 2001) in respect to 
some provisions of the U.S. Patents Code, in particular those of Chapter 18 [38] — “Patent 
Rights in Inventions Made with Federal Assistance,” which, as alleged by Brazil, contained 
several discriminatory elements. Brazil argued that those elements infringed provisions from the 
TRIPS Agreement, especially Articles 27 and 28, as well as provisions from the TRIMs 
Agreement (especially Article 2) and Articles III and XI of GATT 1994. No panel was 
established and no settlement was announced. 
DS239: United States — Anti-Dumping Duties on Silicon Metal from Brazil 
Brazil requested consultations with the United States (September 17th, 2001) and, on 
November 1st, 2001, requested that the original request for consultations be cancelled and 
replaced with a new request. In this new request, Brazil requested consultations with the United 
States regarding Anti-dumping duties imposed by the United States on imports of silicon metal 
from Brazil, arguing that the methodology used was inconsistent with Articles 2.4.2, 5.8, 9.3, 
11.1, 11.2, and 18.3 of the AD Agreement. Thailand joined consultations on September 28th, 
2001, and the EC also requested, on November 19th, 2001, to join the consultations. No panel 
was established and no settlement was announced. 
DS 241: Argentina — Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on Poultry from Brazil 
 (Argentina – Poultry Anti-Dumping Duties) 
Brazil requested consultations with Argentina (November 7th, 2001) concerning 
definitive anti-dumping duties imposed by Argentina on imports of poultry from Brazil, classified 
under MERCOSUR tariff line 0207.11.00 and 0207.12.00. These measures were adopted by 
Argentina’s Ministry of Economy in Resolution 574/2000. Brazil considered that the duties, as 
well as the investigation conducted by Argentina, might have been flawed and were inconsistent 
with Argentina’s obligations under Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 12, and Annex II of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement, Article VI of the GATT 1994, and Articles 1 and 7 of the Customs 
Valuation Agreement. The EC also requested to join the consultations (November 19th 2001). A 
panel was established (April 17th 2002), with Canada, Chile, the EC, Guatemala, Paraguay and 
the United States as third-parties. The Panel report (April 22nd, 2003) found that Argentina had 
acted inconsistently with its obligations under Articles 2.4, 2.4.2, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 5.1, 5.8, 
6.1.1, 6.1.3, 6.8 and Annex II, 6.10, and 12.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. The Panel 
concluded that Argentina had not acted inconsistently with a number of Articles from the same 
Agreement and declined to rule on a number of claims for judicial economy. 
DS250: United States — Equalizing Excise Tax Imposed by Florida on Processed Orange 
and Grapefruit Products (US – Florida Excise Tax) 
On March 20th, 2002, Brazil requested consultations with the United States (March 20th, 
2002) regarding the “Equalizing Excise Tax” imposed by the State of Florida on processed 
orange and grapefruit products produced from citrus fruit grown outside the United States 
(Section 601.155 Florida Statutes). In Brazil’s view,the incidence of this tax on imported 
processed citrus products and not on domestic products on its face constituted a violation of 
Articles II:1(a), III.1, and III:2 of GATT 1994. A panel was established on October 1st, 2002, 
with the EC, Mexico, Paraguay, and Chile (joined on October 11th, 2002) as third-parties. 
Afterwards, the United States and Brazil reached a mutually agreed solution under Article 3.6 of 
the DSU (May 28th, 2004). 
DS259 United States — Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel 
Products (US – Steel Safeguards). 
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Brazil requested consultations with the United States (May 21st, 2002) concerning the 
same definitive safeguard measures imposed by the United States on imports of certain steel 
products. The EC, Japan, Korea, Norway, China, and later Mexico, also petitioned to join the 
consultations. Brazil claimed that the United States measures violated Articles 2.1, 2.2, 3.1, 4, and 
5 of the Agreement on Safeguards and Articles I:1, X:3, and XIX:1 of GATT 1994. A single 
Panel was established, with Canada, Chinese Taipei, Cuba, Malaysia, Mexico, Thailand, Turkey, 
and Venezuela as third-parties (Malaysia withdrew on October 23rd 2002). The Panel concluded 
(July 11th, 2003) that all the United States’ safeguard measures at issue were inconsistent with at 
least one of the following WTO prerequisites for the imposition of a safeguard measure: lack of 
demonstration of (i) unforeseen developments; (ii) increased imports; (iii) causation; and (iv) 
parallelism. On these grounds, the Panel requested that the United States bring the relevant 
safeguard measures into conformity with its obligations under the Agreement on Safeguards and 
GATT 1994. The United States appealed. The AB Report (November 10th, 2003) upheld the 
Panel’s conclusions, although it reversed the Panel’s findings that the United States failed to 
provide a reasoned and adequate explanation on “increased imports” and on the existence of a 
“causal link” between increased imports and serious injury for two of the ten safeguard measures. 
However, even these measures were found to be inconsistent with the WTO Agreement on other 
grounds. 
DS266: European Communities — Export Subsidies on Sugar (EU – Export subsidies on 
 sugar) 
On September 27th, 2002, Australia and Brazil requested consultations with the 
European Communities concerning the export subsidies provided by the EC in the framework of 
its regulations for the sugar sector. Brazil argued that the EC provided, under Council Regulation 
(EC) No. 1260/2001, export subsidies for sugar and sugar containing products above its reduction 
commitment levels specified in Section II of Part IV of its Schedule of Concessions. Brazil also 
believed that the EC sugar regime violated Article III:4 of the GATT 1994. Finally, Brazil 
claimed that the EC was acting inconsistently with at least the requirements of: Articles 3.3, 8, 
9.1(a) and (c), and 10.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture; Articles 3.1(a) and 3.2 of the SCM 
Agreement; and Articles III:4 and XVI of GATT 1994. A single panel comprising the claims of 
Brazil, Australia, and Thailand was established on August 29th 2003, with Barbados, Canada, 
China, Colombia, Jamaica, Mauritius, New Zealand, Trinidad and Tobago, and the United States 
as third-parties (later, Belize, Cuba, Fiji, Guyana, Paraguay, and Swaziland, India, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Tanzania, Thailand, Kenya, and Côte d’Ivoire also joined as third-parties). The Panel 
report (October 15th, 2004) found, inter alia, that the EC had acted inconsistently with its 
obligations under Articles 3.3 and 8 of the Agreement on Agriculture. The EC appealed. The AB 
report (April 28th, 2005) maintained the Panel’s decision, but argued that it erred in not ruling on 
the Complaining Parties’ claims under the SCM Agreement, because the Panel’s ruling under the 
Agreement on Agriculture was insufficient to fully resolve the dispute, especially in relation to 
implementation of a remedy. The EC informed the DSB of its intention to implement the 
recommendations and rulings of the DSB, and stated that it would require a reasonable period of 
time to implement them. On June 8th, 2006, Australia, Brazil and Thailand informed the DSB 
that they each had reached an agreement under Articles 21, and 22 of the DSU with the EC. 
DS267: United States — Subsidies on Upland Cotton (US – Upland Cotton) 
Brazil requested consultations with the United States (September 27th, 2002) regarding 
prohibited and actionable subsidies provided to U.S. producers, users, and/or exporters of upland 
cotton. Brazil argued that these measures were inconsistent with the obligations of the United 
States under: the SCM Agreement; the Agreement on Agriculture; and Article III:4 of GATT 
1994. The panel was established on March 18th, 2003 with Argentina, Canada, China, Chinese 
Taipei, the EC, India, Pakistan, and Venezuela reserved as third-parties (later, Benin, Australia, 
ECLAC – Project Documents Collection The Brazilian Experience in Dispute Settlement 
39 
Paraguay, New Zealand, and Chad also joined as third parties). The Panel report (September 
2004) found that three United States export credit guarantee programs were prohibited export 
subsidies not under the Peace Clause exception, that the United States also granted several other 
prohibited subsidies in respect to cotton, and that this resulted in serious prejudice to Brazil’s 
interests in the form of price suppression in the world market. The United States appealed. The 
AB Report (March 3rd, 2005) modified the Panel’s interpretation of certain aspects of the dispute, 
but, nevertheless, recommended that the prohibited subsidies should be withdrawn over a period 
of six months, and that the subsidies which caused serious prejudice should have their adverse 
effects removed or should be completely withdrawn. 
On August 18th, 2006, Brazil requested the establishment of an Article 21.5 panel, which 
was established on September 1st, 2006 with Argentina, Australia, Canada, China, the EC, India, 
Japan, and New Zealand as third-parties. The panel is expected to complete its work in July of 
2007. 
DS269: European Communities — Customs Classification of Frozen Boneless Chicken 
Cuts (EC- Chicken Cuts) 
On October 11th, 2002, Brazil requested consultations with the European Communities 
concerning EC Commission Regulation No. 1223/2002, which provided a new description of 
frozen boneless chicken cuts under the EC Combined Nomenclature (“CN”) code 0207.14.10. 
According to Brazil, this new description included a salt content to the product that did not exist 
before and subjected the imports of these products to a higher tariff than that applicable to salted 
meat (CN code 0210) in the EC’s Schedules under the GATT 1994. Brazil argued that this 
change violated Articles II and XXVIII of the GATT 1994. In addition, Brazil claimed that the 
application of this measure by the EC nullified and impaired, within the meaning of Article 
XXIII:1, benefits accruing to Brazil directly or indirectly under the GATT 1994. A panel was 
established on November 7th, 2003. China, Thailand and United States participated as third-
parties. The Panel Report (May 30th, 2005) found that the measure was inconsistent with the 
EC’s obligations under Articles II:1(a) and II:1(b) of the GATT 1994. The EC appealed, and so 
did Brazil (on certain issues of law covered by the Panel Report). The AB Report (September 
12th, 2005) upheld the Panel conclusions. On July 26th, 2006, Brazil and the EU informed the 
DSB of an agreement regarding procedures under Articles 21 and 22 of the DSU. 
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IV. The Practice so far 
After this report on the Brazilian experience at the WTO and MERCOSUR, the questions 
proposed by ECLAC may be considered.  
When does Brazil take a case to the DSB? 
As seen in the evolution of the trade community in Brazil, the decision to present a claim 
to the WTO is a result of complex factors. The final decision is taken at the ministerial level, after 
administrative review by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whose decision is influenced by CGC. 
The main factors are: (a) level of pressure and support by the affected private sector; (b) 
economic impact of the foreign measure on Brazilian exports; (c) legal grounds for the case; and 
(d) the reaction from public opinion and the press over the issue. 
How does Brazil choose between WTO or MERCOSUR? 
It seems that, until 2001, Brazil would prefer the MERCOSUR dispute settlement 
mechanism, as a sign of political prestige for the regional agreement. In that year, however, the 
unsound arbitral decision on Argentina-Anti-dumping on Poultry led Brazil to renew the claim 
before the WTO (where the Brazilian argument prevailed). Although no case was presented after 
the clause of jurisdictional choice in the Protocol of Olivos, it is foreseeable that Brazil will  look 
carefully for the forum where rules on the specific issue are clearer. 
How does Brazil prepare the case? 
As mentioned before, the preparation of the case has involved close connections with the 
private sector and with national and foreign law firms, usually funded by the national industry. 
On some occasions, the industry’s interests have not coincided with the CGC´s perception of the 
public interest, and the latter has prevailed on deciding the strategy.  
Has Brazil participated in coalitions? 
Brazil has been noticed as a leading actor among developing countries, especially after 
the Cancun Ministerial Conference, when the G20 coalition was composed. In terms of dispute 
resolution, however, the participation in joint claims is smaller. In United States –Gasoline, for 
instance, Brazil participated with Venezuela in the claims against the U.S. discrimination against 
imported gasoline, but each country determined their own strategy and presented different 
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documents to support the claim. The sole occasion in which Brazil joined a common claim was in 
United States-Byrd Amendment.63  
This behavior could probably be explained by the Brazilian perception that claimants’ 
cases may be conflicting at some point; hence individual documents could guarantee a higher 
level of independence. Nevertheless, Brazil has participated regularly as third party in different 
cases before the DSB. In contrast with the permanent U.S. interest in systemic issues, Brazil’s 
activity as a third party may be identified especially in cases where the challenged measure 
affects a product that Brazil also exports.64 
TABLE 1 
BRAZIL PARTICIPATION AS THIRD PARTY IN DSB CASES  
(Total of 46, up to May 2007) 
 
Case # Case title and parties Other third parties 
DS76 Japan — Measures Affecting Agricultural 
Products (Complainant: US) 
EC; Hungary 
DS89 United States — Anti-Dumping Duties on 
Imports of Colour Television Receivers from 
Korea (Complainant: Korea) 
None 
DS108 United States — Tax Treatment for “Foreign 
Sales Corporations” (Complainant: EC) 
Australia; Barbados; Canada; 
China; India; Jamaica; Japan 
,DS114 Canada — Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical 
Products (Complainant: EC) 
Australia; Colombia; Cuba; 
India; Israel; Japan; Poland; 
Switzerland; Thailand; US 
DS121 Argentina — Safeguard Measures on Imports of 
Footwear (Complainant: EC) 
Indonesia; Paraguay; 
Uruguay; US 
DS135 European Communities — Measures Affecting 
Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos 
(Complainant: Canada) 
Zimbabwe; US 
DS138 United States — Imposition of Countervailing 
Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth 
Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United 
Kingdom (Complainant: EC) 
Mexico 
DS152 United States — Sections 301–310 of the Trade 
Act 1974 (Complainant: EC) 
Canada; Colombia; Costa 
Rica; Cuba; Dominica; 
                                                     
63
 A joint claim was filed by Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Costa Rica, Hong Kong, China, Israel, Mexico, 
and Norway. 
64
 Yet, Shaffer recommends that developing countries should participate as third parties, for three primary 
reasons: “First, an important procedural issue could arise affecting all future cases. Second, the 
interpretation of a point of substantive law could have implications for the country in future cases. 
Third, and perhaps most importantly, a country needs ‘to stay in touch with panel activity’ in order to 
know how panels and the Appellate Body are working so that, when it has a complaint, it can tailor 
legal arguments and litigation strategies accordingly. WTO Appellate Body members and secretariat 
officials change over time. Just as in domestic litigation, a party needs to know the ‘institutional culture 
and personalities’ of the judges and the tribunal” (Shaffer, 2005). 
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Dominican Republic; 
Ecuador; Hong Kong; China; 
India; Israel; Jamaica; Japan; 
Korea; St. Lucia, Thailand 
DS160 United States — Section 110(5) of U.S. 
Copyright Act (Complainant: EC) 
Australia; Canada; Japan; 
Switzerland 
DS174 European Communities — Protection of 
Trademarks and Geographical Indications for 
Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs 
(Complainant: US) 
Argentina; Australia; Brazil; 
Canada; China; Chinese 
Taipei; Colombia; Guatemala; 
India; Mexico; New Zealand; 
Turkey 
DS184 United States — Anti-Dumping Measures on 
Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan 
(Complainant: Japan) 
Canada; Chile; EC; Korea 
DS204 Mexico — Measures Affecting 
Telecommunications Services (Complainant: US) 
Australia; Canada; Cuba; EC; 
Guatemala; Honduras; India; 
Japan; Nicaragua 
DS207 Chile — Price Band System and Safeguard 
Measures Relating to Certain Agricultural 
Products (Complainant: Argentina) 
Australia; Canada; China; 
Colombia; Costa Rica; EC; 
Ecuador; El Salvador; 
Guatemala; Honduras; Japan; 
Nicaragua; Paraguay; Peru; 
Thailand; Venezuela; US 
DS212 United States — Countervailing Measures 
Concerning Certain Products from the European 
Communities (Complainant: EC) 
China; India; Korea; Mexico 
DS234 United States — Continued Dumping and 
Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (Complainants: 
Canada and Mexico) 
Argentina; Australia; Costa 
Rica; EC; Hong Kong, China; 
India; Indonesia; Israel; Japan; 
Korea; Norway; Thailand 
DS244 United States — Sunset Review of Anti-
Dumping Duties on Corrosion-Resistant Carbon 
Steel Flat Products from Japan (Complainant: 
Japan) 
Canada; Chile; EC; India; 
Korea; Norway 
DS245 Japan — Measures Affecting the Importation of 
Apples (Complainant: US) 
Australia; China; Chinese 
Taipei; EC; New Zealand 
DS246 European Communities — Conditions for the 
Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing 
Countries (India) 
Bolivia; Colombia; Costa 
Rica; Cuba; Ecuador; El 
Salvador; Guatemala; 
Honduras; Mauritius; 
Nicaragua; Pakistan; Panama; 
Paraguay; Peru; Sri Lanka; 
Venezuela; US 
DS248 United States — Definitive Safeguard Measures 
on Imports of Certain Steel Products 
Canada; China; Chinese 
Taipei; Japan; Korea; New 
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(Complainant: EC) Zealand; Norway; 
Switzerland; Thailand; 
Turkey; Venezuela 
DS249 United States — Definitive Safeguard Measures 
on Imports of Certain Steel Products 
(Complainant: Japan) 
Canada; China; Chinese 
Taipei; EC; Korea; Mexico; 
New Zealand; Norway; 
Switzerland; Thailand; 
Turkey; Venezuela 
DS251 United States — Definitive Safeguard Measures 
on Imports of Certain Steel Products 
(Complainant: Korea) 
Canada; China; Chinese 
Taipei; EC; Japan; Mexico; 
New Zealand; Norway; 
Switzerland; Thailand; 
Turkey; Venezuela 
DS252 United States — Definitive Safeguard Measures 
on Imports of Certain Steel Products 
(Complainant: China) 
Canada; Chinese Taipei; 
Cuba; EC; Japan; Korea; 
Mexico; New Zealand; 
Norway; Switzerland; 
Thailand; Turkey; Venezuela 
DS253 United States — Definitive Safeguard Measures 
on Imports of Certain Steel Products 
(Complainant: Switzerland) 
Canada; China; Chinese 
Taipei; Cuba; EC; Japan; 
Korea; Mexico; New Zealand; 
Norway; Thailand; Turkey; 
Venezuela 
DS254 United States — Definitive Safeguard Measures 
on Imports of Certain Steel Products 
(Complainant: Norway) 
Canada; China; Chinese 
Taipei; Cuba; EC; Japan; 
Korea; Mexico; New Zealand; 
Switzerland; Thailand; 
Turkey; Venezuela 
DS258 United States — Definitive Safeguard Measures 
on Imports of Certain Steel Products 
(Complainant: New Zealand) 
Canada; China; Chinese 
Taipei; Cuba; EC; Japan; 
Korea; Mexico; Norway; 
Switzerland; Thailand; 
Turkey; Venezuela 
DS265 European Communities — Export Subsidies on 
Sugar (Complainant: Australia) 
Barbados; Belize; Canada; 
China; Colombia; Côte 
d’Ivoire; Cuba; Fiji; Guyana; 
India; Jamaica; Kenya; 
Madagascar; Malawi; 
Mauritius; New Zealand; 
Paraguay; St. Kitts and Nevis; 
Swaziland; Tanzania; 
Thailand; Trinidad and 
Tobago; US; 
DS283 European Communities — Export Subsidies on 
Sugar (Complainant: Thailand) 
Barbados; Belize; Canada; 
China; Colombia; Côte 
d’Ivoire; Cuba; Fiji; Guyana; 
India; Jamaica; Kenya; 
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Madagascar; Malawi; 
Mauritius; New Zealand; 
Paraguay; St. Kitts and Nevis; 
Swaziland; Tanzania; 
Thailand; Trinidad and 
Tobago; US; 
DS286 European Communities — Customs 
Classification of Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts 
(Complainant: Thailand) 
China; US 
DS290 European Communities — Protection of 
Trademarks and Geographical Indications for 
Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs 
(Complainant: Australia) 
Argentina; Australia; Canada; 
China; Chinese Taipei; 
Colombia; Guatemala; India; 
Mexico; New Zealand; 
Turkey; US 
DS291 European Communities — Measures Affecting 
the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products 
(Complainant: US) 
Argentina; Australia; Canada; 
Chile; China; Chinese Taipei; 
Colombia; El Salvador; 
Honduras; Mexico; New 
Zealand; Norway; Paraguay; 
Peru; Thailand; Uruguay 
DS292 European Communities — Measures Affecting 
the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products 
(Complainant: Canada) 
Argentina; Australia; Chile; 
China; Chinese Taipei; 
Colombia; El Salvador; 
Honduras; Mexico; New 
Zealand; Norway; Paraguay; 
Peru; Thailand; Uruguay; US 
DS293 European Communities — Measures Affecting 
the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products 
(Complainant: Argentina) 
Australia; Canada; Chile; 
China; Chinese Taipei; 
Colombia; El Salvador; 
Honduras; Mexico; New 
Zealand; Norway; Paraguay; 
Peru; Thailand; Uruguay; US 
DS294 United States — Laws, Regulations and 
Methodology for Calculating Dumping Margins 
(Zeroing) (Complainant: EC) 
Argentina; China; Chinese 
Taipei; Hong Kong, China; 
India; Japan; Korea; Mexico; 
Norway; Turkey 
DS315 European Communities — Selected Customs 
Matters (Complainant: US) 
Argentina; Australia; China; 
Chinese Taipei; Hong Kong, 
China; India; Japan; Korea 
DS316 European Communities — Measures Affecting 
Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Complainant: US) 
Australia; Canada; China; 
Japan; Korea 
DS317 United States — Measures Affecting Trade in 
Large Civil Aircraft (Complainant: EC) 
Australia; Canada; China; 
Japan; Korea 
DS320 United States — Continued Suspension of 
Obligations in the EC — Hormones Dispute 
Australia; Canada; China; 
Chinese Taipei; India; 
Mexico; New Zealand; 
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(Complainant: EC) Norway 
DS321 Canada — Continued Suspension of Obligations 
in the EC — Hormones Dispute (Complainant: 
EC) 
Australia; China; Chinese 
Taipei; India; Mexico; New 
Zealand; Norway; US 
DS335 United States — Anti-Dumping Measure on 
Shrimp from Ecuador (Complainant: Ecuador) 
Chile; China; EC; India; 
Japan; Korea; Mexico; 
Thailand 
DS339 China — Measures Affecting Imports of 
Automobile Parts (Complainant: EC) 
Argentina; Australia; Japan; 
Mexico; Chinese Taipei; 
Thailand 
DS340 China — Measures Affecting Imports of 
Automobile Parts (Complainant: US) 
Argentina; Australia; Japan; 
Mexico; Chinese Taipei; 
Thailand 
DS342 China — Measures Affecting Imports of 
Automobile Parts (Complainant: Canada) 
Argentina; Australia; Japan; 
Mexico; Chinese Taipei; 
Thailand 
DS343 United States — Measures Relating to Shrimp 
from Thailand (Complainant: Thailand) 
Chile; China; EC; India; 
Korea; Japan; Mexico; Viet 
Nam 
DS345 United States — Customs Bond Directive for 
Merchandise Subject to Anti-
Dumping/Countervailing Duties (Complainant: 
India) 
China; EC; Japan; Thailand 
DS347 European Communities and Certain Member 
States — Measures Affecting Trade in Large 
Civil Aircraft (2nd Complaint) (Complainant: US) 
Australia; Canada; China; 
Japan; Korea 
DS353 United States — Measures Affecting Trade in 
Large Civil Aircraft (2nd Complaint) 
(Complainant: EC) 




Although Brazilian participation at the DSB seems primarily defined by its export 
interests, some systemic issues have prompted the country’s reaction. Such reaction is particularly 
seen at the DSB meetings, leading sometimes to harsh debates between the involved diplomats.65 
Hence, Brazilian interventions are particularly vocal regarding delays from developed 
countries in the implementation of DSB decisions. The repeated claims against the U.S. practice 
of “zeroing” have been mentioned by Brazil.66 Brazil has also reacted against forms of 
                                                     
65
 On January 12th, 2007, for instance, when the United States argued that Brazil has disrespected the 
confidential aspect of opposing panelists, “[t]he representative of Brazil said that with regard to 
responsibility and cooperation, Brazil was better equipped than the United States to speak, but he 
suspected that whatever Brazil referred to now would be treated as a breach of confidentiality by the 
United States”,. Cf. WT/DSB/M/222. 
66
 United States – Anti-dumping measure on shrimp from Ecuador, cf. WT/DSB/M/226, March 3rd, 2007. 
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implementation that could lead to new barriers in international trade.67 Consistently, Brazil has 
noted that “the DSB's decision should not be read as a license for indefinite continuation of the 
non-compliance situation, which had lasted for too long in the present dispute. Brazil urged the 
parties to the dispute to take advantage of the positive momentum that had led to the bilateral 
agreement on procedures: i.e., either to reach a mutually satisfactory solution consistent with the 
multilateral rules and beneficial to all Members or to develop ways towards an expedited 
withdrawal of the illegal measure”.68 
How does Brazil act in the negotiation arena? 
The Brazilian experience seems to reflect a practice of evaluating the timing for 
presenting a case. Thus, the filing of claims in EC-Sugar and U.S.-Cotton were calculated to have 
a decision by the end of the Doha agenda of negotiations. The reports favoring the Brazilian 
arguments were thought to represent an acquis that would not require further concessions during 
the negotiations. 
Still in the negotiation arena, Brazil has managed successfully the participation of NGOs 
and the private sector, as noted before in this paper. In topics related to either pharmaceuticals or 
cotton subsidies, Brazil has given attention to the international public opinion and to a well-
orchestrated release through the world press. 
Nevertheless, Brazil´s initial position was critical to amicus curiae briefs.69 Most 
probably, the country´s initial concern was that NGOs funded by entities in developed countries 
could undermine the negotiation sphere. Moreover, environmental issues – a common concern for 
many NGOs – are a sensitive topic in Brazilian politics. This may explain why Brazil (in spite of 
the fruitful experience with NGOs), has still recently opposed the admission of amicus curiae 
briefs by the panels.70 
How to change the strategy, according to the phase in the dispute? 
The cases analyzed demonstrate that Brazil has pursued the same strategy once a claim is 
presented. This line of behavior can probably be explained by the long domestic process for a 
claim to be approved. 
                                                     
67
 For example, regarding the implementation of EC–Sugar, Brazil noted that “Members should, at a 
minimum, apply a standstill as to the export subsidies commitments in place. Instead, by taking its 
decision on declassification on 22 September 2005, the EC had detracted from its commitments in this 
area. Hardly anyone could find a more deleterious way to express the gap between the words and the 
deeds.” Cf. WT/DSB/M/198, Oct 26th, 2005. 
68
 WT/DSB/M/199, Nov 11th, 2005 [regarding United States – Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act 
of 1998: Status report by the United States]. 
69
 “Brazil, in its third participant's submission, and Mexico, in a letter submitted to us on 23 February 
2000, agree with the European Communities that the Appellate Body does not have the authority to 
accept  amicus curiae  briefs.  Brazil and Mexico emphasize that neither the DSU nor the  Working 
Procedures  allow the Appellate Body to receive factual information of the type contemplated by Article  
13 of the DSU, much less briefs from private entities containing legal arguments on the issues under 
appeal […]. Brazil adds that Members of the WTO and, in particular, parties and third parties to a 
dispute, are uniquely qualified to make legal arguments regarding panel reports and the parameters of 
WTO obligations.” Cf. US-Lead and Bismuth II (DS138), AB report, par. 37. The same position was 
reasserted in DS248, DS249, DS251, DS252, DS253, DS254, DS258, and DS259. 
70
 “Again, in the recent and controversial US–Steel Safeguards case, the Appellate Body itself (again) 
faced a barrage of renewed arguments against the admission of an amicus curiae brief submitted by the 
American Institute for International Steel. Brazil cited (the usual) ‘‘legal and systemic concerns’’ 
against admitting the brief. Likewise, Mexico, Cuba and Thailand opposed the admission of the brief”. 
Cf. Lim, 2005, p. 85. 
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How does Brazil fulfill its obligations?  
The low number of cases in which Brazil has been the respondent does not allow a 
definite tendency to be identified. However, except for Brazil-Aircraft, the other cases were 
complied with in a relative short period of time, mainly through changes in administrative 
regulations. This is particularly true in the cases where a negotiated agreement was achieved. 
An interesting situation regarding compliance in Brazil will be seen in the near future. 
Indeed, on June 12th, 2007, the panel on Brazil-Retreated Tires issued its report.71 Basically, the 
panel accepted Brazil’s arguments that the ban on imports of retreaded tires was justifiable as 
necessary to protect the environment and public health. However, the panel also considered that 
imports of used tires, for use as raw material by the domestic industry, made possible by judicial 
injunctions, jeopardize the objectives of the Brazilian measures and introduce a discriminatory 
element that is incompatible with the multilateral trading rules. The challenge for Brazil (if this 
decision is maintained by the Appellate Body) will be to convince its domestic judiciary to follow 
the same line of reasoning. 
 
 
                                                     
71
 Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tires, WT/DS/332R. 
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V. Conclusion  
According to a foreign analyst, Brazil is the leading example of a developing country that 
adapted its strategies to the challenges of the legalized and judicialized WTO regime.72 If Shaffer 
is right, it is also true that the Brazilian example cannot be repeated in every developing country, 
due to its particular features. 
In fact, Brazil has been extremely successful when using coalitions with private entities, 
who have been supportive of the claims in a variety of ways, including financially. Moreover, the 
claims have become a source of political prestige within governmental and business spheres, even 
when compliance with the DSB recommendations is not immediate. 
On the other hand, the development of human capacity related to trade matters, either in 
government and among practitioners, has been an experience that could create enthusiasm for 
other developing countries. The Brazilian practice of “learning by doing” in Geneva and 
Washington is different from traditional capacity-building efforts, and it has guaranteed that a 
new generation of trade specialists will influence this topic in the near future. 
 
                                                     
72
 Shaffer et al., 2006, p. 3. 
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